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As  the field of homeland  defense and 
security expands  and matures, the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r o m v a r i o u s 
disciplines  become ever more 
important. Particularly exciting are 
technical advances that have real-
world application to homeland 
security practices. For this  reason, 
Homeland Security Affairs  is pleased 
to partner, for the second year, with 
the IEEE in  presenting the best 
papers  from  the Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security.
The 2011 HST Conference drew 
attendees from  federal agencies, 
universities, national laboratories, 
federally funded research and 
d e v e l o p m e n t c e n t e r s , s m a l l 
businesses, and industry. Peer-
reviewed technical papers  were 
o r g a n i z e d a l o n g f o u r t r a c k s 
highlighting  emerging technologies 
in  the areas of (1) cyber security; (2) 
attack  and disaster preparation, 
recovery, and response; (3) land and 
maritime  border security; and  (4) 
biometric, forensics, and physical 
security. One paper from each of 
these tracks was selected as  the  “best 
paper”; a fifth  paper was  awarded 
as  the  “best paper” from  the 
conference as a whole. 
The practical application of the 
technological innovations  presented 
in  these  papers  adds  to the overall 
strength  of homeland security 
efforts. As always, we welcome your 
c o m m e n t s  a n d o p i n i o n s  a t 
www.hsaj.org.
Notes From The Editor
As the field of homeland defense and security  expands and matures, the contributions from 
various disciplines become ever  more important. Particularly  exciting  are technical  advances 
that  have real-world application  to homeland security  practices. For  this reason, Homeland 
Security Affairs  is pleased to partner, for  the second year, with  the IEEE in presenting the best 
papers from the Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security.
The 2011  HST  Conference drew  attendees from  federal  agencies,  universities,  national 
laboratories, federally  funded research  and development  centers, small businesses,  and 
industry.  Peer-reviewed technical papers were organized along  four  tracks highlighting 
emerging  technologies in  the areas of (1) cyber  security; (2) attack  and disaster  preparation, 
recovery, and response; (3) land and maritime border  security; and (4)  biometric, forensics,  and 
physical security.
The award of best  paper  of the conference went to “Person Attribute Search  for Large-
area  Video Surveillance” by  Jason  Thornton and others.  This research  offers video analytics 
to enable an  operator  to search through large volumes of surveillance video data  to find persons 
who match  a  particular  attribute profile.  The technology  is geared for  enabling efficient and 
effective monitoring  of large areas at  a  distance under  challenging  real-world conditions to 
locate and track persons of interest  in  real time. State-of-the-art  features and matching and 
tracking algorithms are used with  solid statistical underpinnings. The prototype system  pictured 
in  the paper  has been  demonstrated to cabinet-level USG officials with  glowing  feedback. 
Person-attribute-search  technology  for  large-area video surveillance is likely  to be a  ‘game 
changing’ technology for homeland security.
The best paper of the cyber  security  track, “Measuring the Human Factor of Cyber 
Security,” by  Brian  Bowen, Salvatore  Stolfo,  and Ramaswamy  Devarajan, offers a  novel 
approach  to measuring, quantifying  and evaluating the security  posture of human  organizations, 
especially  within  large corporations and government agencies. As the authors assert,  “Computer 
security  is not just  about  technology  and systems. It  is also about  the people who use whose 
systems and how  their  vulnerable behaviors can  lead to exploitation.”  Demonstrating and 
validating  the research results through  experimentation and testing,  the authors describe the 
importance of addressing  the human  as well as technology  aspects of securing  the nation’s 
information  technology  infrastructure.  Accessible to a  wide audience and providing  a 
description of the problem, this paper  explores possible approaches and experimental results as 
well as indications of how the work can be extended and applied more broadly.  
“Integrated PMR-Broadband-IP Network for  Secure Real-time Multimedia 
Information  Sharing,” by  Sebastian Subik  and Christian  Wietfeld received the award for  best 
paper in the attack and disaster  preparation,  recovery,  and response track.  The authors provide 
a  compelling  exploration of an  innovative,  IP-based approach  to integrating well-established, 
but limited,  professional mobile radio (PMR) technologies, such  as terrestrial trunked radio 
(TETRA), with  the now  rapidly  emerging  3G and 4G/LTE wireless communications solutions for 
public safety.  The proposed “Push-to-X,”  peer-to-peer  architecture the authors describe offers 
the first-responder  community  a  potential “soft migration” path  forward for  achieving  a  full-
featured, interoperable, and securable public safety communications environment.
In  the land and maritime border security  track,  the award went to “Database of High-Z 
Signatures in  Cargo,” by  Ron  Bentley. The automated detection of dangerous contraband – 
particularly  high-Z radiological  or  nuclear  materials within  full-sized closed shipping containers 
– is of primary  importance to homeland security.  This paper  describes the results of 
commercial prototypes using  dual  energy  x-ray  transmission imaging  inspection systems. The 
benefits of the dual energy  method allow  for  significant  improvement of detecting threats within 
complex high-density  cargo as compared to conventional  radiograph  x-ray  imaging  method. The 
database gathered in  this work supports the development of high-confidence automated image 
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processing algorithms. Of note is the author’s attention  to achieving  low  false alarm  rates with 
realistic  background conditions,  an  aspect  of performance that  can be overlooked by  technology 
developers, and yet is critically  important  to the widespread operational use of advanced 
technology.
“Tunable, Self-curing Polymers for the Forensic Collection of Latent  Signatures 
from  Within Porous Materials,” by  Joseph E.  Chipuk  and others, received the best  paper 
award in  the fourth  and final track,  biometrics, forensics,  and physical security.  In  this paper, 
the authors present  a  unique method for  collecting  information  from  porous surfaces using  a 
self-curing polymer  that  represents a  vast  improvement  over  using  tapes,  fingerprint lifters,  gel 
lifters, or  leaching a  liquid into a  swab or  filter  paper. Smooth,  nonporous surfaces such as metal 
and glass are not a challenge for  this sampling  method, which lends itself to ever-increasing 
clandestine operations where the preparation  surface could be a  garage floor  or even  a parking 
lot.
The practical application of these and other  technological innovations adds to the overall 
strength  of homeland security  efforts. As always, we welcome your comments and opinions at 
www.hsaj.org.
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3HUVRQ $WWULEXWH 6HDUFK )RU /DUJH$UHD 9LGHR
6XUYHLOODQFH
-DVRQ 7KRUQWRQ -HDQHWWH %DUDQ*DOH 'DQLHO %XWOHU 0LFKDHO &KDQ +HDWKHU =ZDKOHQ
0,7 /LQFROQ /DERUDWRU\  :RRG 6W /H[LQJWRQ 0D 
$EVWUDFW²7KLV SDSHU GHVFULEHV QRYHO YLGHR DQDO\WLFV WHFKQRO
RJ\ ZKLFK DOORZV DQ RSHUDWRU WR VHDUFK WKURXJK ODUJH YROXPHV RI
VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR GDWD WR ILQG SHUVRQV WKDW PDWFK D SDUWLFXODU
DWWULEXWH SURILOH 6LQFH WKH SURSRVHG WHFKQLTXH LV JHDUHG IRU
VXUYHLOODQFH RI ODUJH DUHDV WKLV SURILOH FRQVLVWV RI DWWULEXWHV WKDW
DUH REVHUYDEOH DW D GLVWDQFH LQFOXGLQJ FORWKLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ
KDLU FRORU JHQGHU HWF UDWKHU WKDQ LGHQWLI\LQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ DW
WKH IDFH OHYHO 7KH SXUSRVH RI WKLV WRRO LV WR DOORZ VHFXULW\
VWDII RU LQYHVWLJDWRUV WR TXLFNO\ ORFDWH D SHUVRQRILQWHUHVW LQ
UHDO WLPH HJ EDVHG RQ ZLWQHVV GHVFULSWLRQV RU WR VSHHG XS
WKH SURFHVV RI YLGHREDVHG IRUHQVLF LQYHVWLJDWLRQV 7KH SURSRVHG
DOJRULWKP FRQVLVWV RI WZR PDLQ FRPSRQHQWV D WHFKQLTXH IRU
GHWHFWLQJ LQGLYLGXDO PRYLQJ SHUVRQV LQ ODUJH DQG SRWHQWLDOO\
FURZGHG VFHQHV DQG DQ DOJRULWKP IRU VFRULQJ KRZ ZHOO HDFK
GHWHFWLRQ PDWFKHV D JLYHQ DWWULEXWH SURILOH EDVHG RQ D JHQHUDWLYH
SUREDELOLVWLF PRGHO 7KH V\VWHP GHVFULEHG LQ WKLV SDSHU KDV
EHHQ LPSOHPHQWHG DV D SURRIRIFRQFHSW LQWHUDFWLYH VRIWZDUH
WRRO DQG KDV EHHQ DSSOLHG WR GLIIHUHQW WHVW YLGHR GDWDVHWV
LQFOXGLQJ FROOHFWLRQV LQ DQ DLUSRUW WHUPLQDO DQG FROOHFWLRQV LQ DQ
RXWGRRU HQYLURQPHQW IRU ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW PRQLWRULQJ 7KLV SDSHU
GLVFXVVHV SHUIRUPDQFH VWDWLVWLFV PHDVXUHG RQ WKHVH GDWDVHWV DV
ZHOO DV NH\ DOJRULWKPLF FKDOOHQJHV DQG XVHIXO H[WHQVLRQV RI WKLV
ZRUN EDVHG RQ HQGXVHU IHHGEDFN
, ,1752'8&7,21
'ULYHQ E\ UHFHQW DGYDQFHV LQ GLJLWDO YLGHR FDPHUD GHVLJQ
YLGHR PDQDJHPHQW V\VWHPV DQG HIILFLHQW DUFKLYLQJ VHFXULW\ DW
ODUJH SXEOLFO\ DFFHVVLEOH IDFLOLWLHV DQG XUEDQ VLWHV LQFUHDVLQJO\
GHSOR\ FRPSUHKHQVLYH YLGHR VXUYHLOODQFH V\VWHPV >@ 6XFK
V\VWHPV VXSSRUW ERWK WKH DELOLW\ WR PRQLWRU ZLGH DUHDV LQ
UHDO WLPH DQG WKH DELOLW\ WR FRQGXFW IRUHQVLF UHYLHZV DIWHU
DQ LQFLGHQW RU D WLS 0RVW DQDO\VLV RI VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR IRU
VHFXULW\ SXUSRVHV UHTXLUHV WKH RSHUDWRUV RU LQYHVWLJDWRUV WR
VHDUFK IRU SDUWLFXODU W\SHV RI YLGHR FRQWHQW HJ VSHFLILF
DFWLRQV RU EHKDYLRUV RU YHKLFOHV REMHFWV RU SHUVRQVILWWLQJ
D JLYHQ GHVFULSWLRQ :KLOH WKH IXOO\ DWWHQWLYH KXPDQ YLVXDO
V\VWHP LV YHU\ DGHSW DW LQWHUSUHWLQJ YLGHR FRQWHQW LW LV DOVR
W\SLFDOO\ OLPLWHG LQ FDSDFLW\ WR UHYLHZLQJ RQH FDPHUD YLHZ
DW D WLPH DW VSHHGV QHDU UHDOWLPH GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH OHYHO
RI DFWLYLW\ LQ WKH VFHQH DV D UHVXOW VHDUFKLQJ RYHU ODUJH
DPRXQWV RI VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR FDQ EH D VORZ DQG FXPEHUVRPH
SURFHVV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH KXPDQ DWWHQWLRQ VSDQ GRHV QRW SHUVLVW
DW IXOO FDSDFLW\ RYHU ORQJ WLPH SHULRGV 7KLV LV WKH PRWLYDWLRQ
IRU DXWRPDWLF YLGHR VHDUFK WHFKQRORJ\ ZKLFK FDQ GLUHFW WKH
DWWHQWLRQ RI VHFXULW\ SHUVRQQHO RU LQYHVWLJDWRUV WR SRWHQWLDOO\
7KLV ZRUN LV VSRQVRUHG E\ WKH $VVLVWDQW 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH IRU 5H
VHDUFK DQG (QJLQHHULQJ DQG WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI +RPHODQG 6HFXULW\ 6FLHQFH
DQG 7HFKQRORJ\ 'LUHFWRUDWH XQGHU $LU )RUFH &RQWUDFW )$&
2SLQLRQV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DQG FRQFOXVLRQV DUH WKRVH RI WKH
DXWKRUV DQG DUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ HQGRUVHG E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV *RYHUQPHQW
XVHIXO YLGHR FRQWHQW >@ 7KLV SDSHU FRQVLGHUV D VSHFLILF W\SH RI
DXWRPDWHG VHDUFK WKDW DGGUHVVHV D FRPPRQ RSHUDWLRQDO QHHG
WKH VHDUFK IRU SHUVRQVRILQWHUHVW DFURVV ODUJH VXUYHLOOHG DUHDV
0RVW UHVHDUFK LQWR YLGHREDVHG VHDUFK IRU SHUVRQV IRFXVHV
RQ ELRPHWULF UHFRJQLWLRQ XVLQJ VLJQDWXUHV WKDW FDQ EH FDSWXUHG
DW D GLVWDQFH VXFK DV JDLW >@ RU HVSHFLDOO\ IDFH >@>@
+RZHYHU IDFH UHFRJQLWLRQ V\VWHPV FDQ RQO\ EH HPSOR\HG
ZKHQ VXUYHLOODQFH FDPHUDV FDSWXUH IDFH LPDJHV DW VXIILFLHQW
UHVROXWLRQ DQG LOOXPLQDWLRQ ,Q IDFW H[SHULPHQWDO VWXGLHV LQ
GLFDWH WKDW IDFH UHFRJQLWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH EHJLQV WR GHJUDGH DW
FRPSUHVVHG LPDJH UHVROXWLRQV DV KLJK DV  SL[HOV EHWZHHQ
WKH H\HV >@ WKLV LV PXFK JUHDWHU UHVROXWLRQ WKDQ W\SLFDOO\
SURYLGHG E\ VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR XQOHVV FDPHUDV DUH VHWXS ZLWK
QDUURZ ILHOGV RI YLHZ HJ PRQLWRULQJ VSHFLILF GRRUZD\V DW
FORVH UDQJH ,Q DGGLWLRQ ELRPHWULF UHFRJQLWLRQ UHTXLUHV D
GDWDEDVH RI SULRU HQUROOPHQW UHFRUGV DJDLQVW ZKLFK WR SHUIRUP
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ 7KLV GRHV QRW DSSO\ ZKHQ VHFXULW\ SHUVRQQHO
RU LQYHVWLJDWRUV DUH ZRUNLQJ ZLWK DQ H\HZLWQHVV GHVFULSWLRQ
RI D SHUVRQ RI LQWHUHVW $Q DOWHUQDWLYH DSSURDFK LV WR SHUIRUP
DXWRPDWLF VHDUFK IRU SHUVRQV ZKR PDWFK D EDVLF DSSHDUDQFH
SURILOH LQFOXGLQJ FORWKLQJ SK\VLFDO DWWULEXWHV JHQGHU KDLU
FRORU DQG FDUULHG REMHFWV VXFK DV EDJV RU EDFNSDFNV 1RWH
WKDW PDQ\ RI WKHVH DWWULEXWHV DUH WHPSRUDU\ LQ QDWXUH DQG WDNHQ
WRJHWKHU GR QRW QHFHVVDULO\ GHVFULEH D XQLTXH LQGLYLGXDO LQ WKH
DUHD XQGHU VXUYHLOODQFH EXW WKH\ DUH REVHUYDEOH WKURXJK YLGHR
DW D GLVWDQFH 7KH DELOLW\ WR SHUIRUP DXWRPDWLF VHDUFKHV EDVHG
RQ WKHVH DWWULEXWHV KDV WKH SRWHQWLDO WR PDNH PDQ\ PRQLWRULQJ
DQG IRUHQVLF VHDUFK WDVNV PXFK PRUH HIILFLHQW
7KHUH KDYH EHHQ VHYHUDO UHFHQW DWWHPSWV WR LQFRUSRUDWH DS
SHDUDQFH GHVFULSWLRQV RI SHUVRQV LQWR YLGHR VHDUFK WHFKQLTXHV
LQFOXGLQJ VRFDOOHG ³VRIW ELRPHWULFV´ %RWK 9DTXHUR HW DO >@
DQG 'HPLUNXV HW DO >@ ORFDOL]H SHUVRQV DQG IURQWDO IDFHV
LQ YLGHR XVLQJ VWDQGDUG +DDU IHDWXUH FDVFDGH FODVVLILHUV DQG
IRFXV SULPDULO\ RQ WKH FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RI IDFLDO DWWULEXWHV IRU
LPDJHV FDSWXUHG DW UHODWLYHO\ FORVH UDQJH WR WKH FDPHUD )RU
LQVWDQFH WKH DXWKRUV LQ >@ VKRZ SURPLVLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH RQ
WKH GHWHFWLRQ RI IDFLDO KDLU DQG JODVVHV ZKLOH WKH DXWKRUV LQ
>@ GHPRQVWUDWH VRPH DELOLW\ WR FODVVLI\ JHQGHU DQG HWKQLFLW\
EDVHG RQ IDFLDO IHDWXUHV ,W LV XQFOHDU KRZ ZHOO WKHVH WHFKQLTXHV
ZRXOG H[WHQG WR ORQJHU UDQJHV RQ WKH RUGHU RI WHQV RI PHWHUV
ZKHUH GHWDLOHG IDFH LPDJHV DUH QR ORQJHU DYDLODEOH ,Q DGGLWLRQ
ERWK SDSHUV GHVFULEH VLPSOH WHFKQLTXHV IRU UHFRJQL]LQJ FORWK
LQJ FRORU EDVHG RQ WKH H[WUDFWLRQ RI GRPLQDQW FRORUV LQ SUHVHW
UHJLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH ERXQGLQJ ER[ VXUURXQGLQJ HDFK SHUVRQ :H
SURSRVH DQ H[WHQVLRQ RI WKLV VRUW RI DQDO\VLV LQFRUSRUDWLQJ
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV REVHUYDEOH DW D GLVWDQFH EDVHG RQ D JHQHUDWLYH
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SUREDELOLVWLF PRGHO WKDW GHVFULEHV WKH H[SHFWHG YDULDWLRQ LQ
DSSHDUDQFH JLYHQ D SDUWLFXODU DWWULEXWH SURILOH 7KH PDLQ DG
YDQWDJHV RI WKLV PRGHO DUH LWV DELOLW\ WR VXFFHVVIXOO\ UHFRJQL]H
PDQ\ GLIIHUHQW FRPELQDWLRQV RI DWWULEXWHV LQFOXGLQJ PXOWL
FRORUHG FORWKLQJ DQG KDQGFDUULHG REMHFWV DQG LWV IOH[LELOLW\
DFURVV GLIIHUHQW SRVHV DQG ERG\ W\SHV
6HFWLRQ ,, JLYHV DQ RYHUYLHZ RI WKH PDLQ FRPSRQHQWV RI
WKH SURSRVHG DOJRULWKP DV ZHOO DV VRPH GHWDLOV DERXW LWV
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 6HFWLRQ ,,, GHVFULEHV DQ LQWHUDFWLYH VRIWZDUH
WRRO EXLOW WR WHVW WKH DOJRULWKP RQ VHYHUDO UHDO VXUYHLOODQFH
GDWDVHWV 6HFWLRQ ,9 SURYLGHV VRPH SHUIRUPDQFH PHWULFV RQ
WKHVH GDWDVHWV DQG 6HFWLRQ 9 GLVFXVVHV VRPH RI WKH FKDOOHQJHV
DQG XVHIXO H[WHQVLRQV IRU WKLV ZRUN
,, 6($5&+ $/*25,7+0
7KH SURSRVHG VHDUFK WHFKQLTXH KDV WZR PDLQ FRPSRQHQWV
7KH ILUVW LV D GHWHFWLRQ SURFHVV WKDW LQJHVWV UDZ YLGHR DQG
ILQGV LQVWDQFHV RI PRYLQJ SHUVRQV ZLWKLQ HDFK FDPHUD YLHZ
7KLV SURFHVV LV GHVLJQHG WR UXQ LQ UHDOWLPH DQDO\]LQJ RQH
IUDPH SHU FDPHUD SHU VHFRQG DQG VWRULQJ WKH GHWHFWLRQV DV
WLPHVWDPSHG DQG ORFDWLRQVWDPSHG UHFRUGV LQ D GDWDEDVH 7KH
VHFRQG FRPSRQHQW PDWFKHV GHWHFWLRQV WR D VSHFLILHG DWWULEXWH
SURILOH *LYHQ D SHUVRQ GHVFULSWLRQ WKLV SURFHVV VFRUHV WKH OLNH
OLKRRG WKDW HDFK GHWHFWLRQ LQ WKH GDWDEDVH ILWV WKDW SURILOH E\
HYDOXDWLQJ D SUREDELOLVWLF JHQHUDWLYH DSSHDUDQFH PRGHO %RWK
FRPSRQHQWV PXVW EH DFFXUDWH DQG FRPSXWDWLRQDOO\ HIILFLHQW LQ
RUGHU WR VXSSRUW XVHIXO DXWRPDWLF TXHULHV
$ 0RYLQJ 3HUVRQ 'HWHFWLRQ
%HFDXVH RI WKH KLJK UHGXQGDQF\ RI YLGHR FRQWHQW IURP RQH
IUDPH WR WKH QH[W WKH GHWHFWLRQ SURFHVVLQJ FKDLQ ILUVW VDPSOHV
WKH YLGHR VWUHDP DW RQH IUDPH SHU VHFRQG 7KH JRDO RI WKLV
SURFHVVLQJ LV WR ILQG SHUVRQV LQ PRWLRQ VLQFH WKHUH LV QR
QHHG WR VWRUH VWDWLRQDU\ VXEMHFWV UHSHDWHGO\ WR WKH GHWHFWLRQ
GDWDEDVH $V LV W\SLFDOO\ GRQH ZH XVH D VOLGLQJ ZLQGRZ
DSSURDFK WR HYDOXDWH FDQGLGDWH GHWHFWLRQ ORFDWLRQV ZLWKLQ HDFK
IUDPH ZKHUH D FDQGLGDWH ORFDWLRQ LV VSHFLILHG E\ WKH SRVLWLRQ
RI D ERXQGLQJ ER[ (x, y) DQG LWV GLPHQVLRQV (w, h) VLQFH ZH
DVVXPH D IL[HG DVSHFW UDWLR IRU WKH ERXQGLQJ ER[ GLPHQVLRQV
WKHUH DUH WKUHH SDUDPHWHU YDOXHV WR VZHHS WKURXJK GXULQJ
VHDUFK %URDGO\ HDFK GHWHFWLRQ PXVW VDWLVI\ WKUHH FULWHULD
LW PXVW H[KLELW D KXPDQ VKDSH LW PXVW ILW WKH JURXQG SODQH
FRQVWUDLQWV RI WKH VFHQH DQG LW PXVW FRQWDLQ D KLJK UDWLR RI
IRUHJURXQG SL[HOV DV RSSRVHG WR VWDWLF EDFNJURXQG )LJXUH 
GHSLFWV VDPSOH GHWHFWLRQV WKDW PHHW WKHVH WKUHH FULWHULD
7KHUH KDV EHHQ VLJQLILFDQW SURJUHVV RYHU WKH ODVW GHFDGH
RQ LPDJH SURFHVVLQJ WHFKQLTXHV WKDW UHFRJQL]H KXPDQ VKDSHV
RU FRQWRXUV 0RVW QRWDEO\ 'DODO DQG 7ULJJV >@ SURSRVHG WKH
XVH RI KLVWRJUDPV RI RULHQWHG JUDGLHQWV +2* IHDWXUHV DV WKH
EDVLV IRU D KXPDQ FRQWRXU GHWHFWRU +LVWRJUDPV RI RULHQWHG
JUDGLHQWV SURYLGH D FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RI REMHFW FRQWRXUV ZKLFK
LV VRPHZKDW LQYDULDQW WR OLJKWLQJ FRQGLWLRQV DQG FRORU FRQWUDVW
DQG FDQ EH XVHG WR WUDLQ D VXSSRUW YHFWRU PDFKLQH 690
FODVVLILHU WKDW GHWHFWV WKH KXPDQ IRUP ZLWK LPSUHVVLYH DFFX
UDF\ +RZHYHU HYHQ VWDWHRIWKHDUW FRQWRXUEDVHG GHWHFWRUV
WHQG WR SURGXFH PXOWLSOH IDOVH SRVLWLYHV SHU IUDPH IRU WKH
)LJ  'HWHFWLRQV RI PRYLQJ SHUVRQV LQ D VDPSOH YLGHR IUDPH
W\SHV RI ODUJH DQG YLVXDOO\ FRPSOH[ VFHQHV FRPPRQ LQ YLGHR
VXUYHLOODQFH DSSOLFDWLRQV ,Q RUGHU WR UHGXFH WKH IUHTXHQF\ RI
IDOVH SRVLWLYHV ZH DOVR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI SULRU LQIRUPDWLRQ
DERXW WKH VFHQH DQG WKH G\QDPLF QDWXUH RI YLGHR
0RVW VXUYHLOODQFH FDPHUDV FDSWXUH VFHQHV LQ ZKLFK WKH
DFWLYLW\ RI LQWHUHVW RFFXUV DORQJ DQ DSSUR[LPDWH JURXQG SODQH
WKDW UHPDLQV IL[HG QRWDEOH H[FHSWLRQV LQFOXGH DFWLYH SDQWLOW
]RRP FDPHUDV DQG YLHZV WKDW GHSLFW PXOWLSOH OHYHOV VWDLUV
HWF :KHQ WKLV DVVXPSWLRQ LV UHDVRQDEOH ZH FDQ XVH LQIRUPD
WLRQ DERXW WKH JURXQG SODQH OHDUQHG GXULQJ DQ RIIOLQH WUDLQLQJ
VWHS WR HOLPLQDWH IDOVH SRVLWLYHV EDVHG RQ WKH VL]H DQG SRVLWLRQ
RI WKH GHWHFWLRQ 7KH JURXQG SODQH LQIRUPDWLRQ LV HQFRGHG LQ D
SHUVSHFWLYH PRGHO VLPLODU WR WKH RQH XVHG LQ >@ 0RUH VSHFLI
LFDOO\ WKLV PRGHO OHDUQV D SODQDU KRPRJUDSK\ ZKLFK PDSV IRRW
SRVLWLRQ WR H[SHFWHG KHDG SRVLWLRQ ,I DOO SHUVRQV LQ WKH VFHQH
DUH VWDQGLQJ XSULJKW RQ D SODQDU VXUIDFH WKLV HQVXUHV WKDW WKH
IRRWWRKHDG PDSSLQJ LV DQ DIILQH PDS EHWZHHQ SODQHV LQ '
VSDFH VSHFLI FDOO\ WUDQVODWLRQ E\ WKH KHLJKW RI WKH SHUVRQ
DQG WKHUHIRUH LQGXFHV D SODQH KRPRJUDSK\ ZKHQ SURMHFWHG LQWR
LPDJH FRRUGLQDWHV )RU D FDQGLGDWH ERXQGLQJ ER[ ZH PHDVXUH
WKH QRUPDOL]HG ³SHUVSHFWLYH HUURU´ RI ERXQGLQJ ER[ SRVLWLRQ





ZKHUH hest LV WKH HVWLPDWHG KHLJKW IRU SRVLWLRQ !p FRPSXWHG
E\ PDSSLQJ WKH IRRW SRVLWLRQ WR D KHDG SRVLWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ
WR WKH VFHQH KRPRJUDSK\ WKHQ WDNLQJ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ
SURMHFWHG KHDG SRVLWLRQ DQG DFWXDO IRRW SRVLWLRQ
)LQDOO\ VLQFH RXU REMHFWLYH LV WR GHWHFW PRYLQJ SHUVRQV DQG
D VLJQLILFDQW UDWLR RI KXPDQ FRQWRXU IDOVH SRVLWLYHV DUH JHQHU
DWHG E\ VWDWLF EDFNJURXQG SDWWHUQV ZH DOVR OHDUQ D G\QDPLF
EDFNJURXQG PRGHO RI WKH YLGHR VFHQH 7\SLFDO ³EDFNJURXQG
VXEWUDFWLRQ´ WHFKQLTXHV OHDUQ DGDSWLYH VWDWLVWLFDO PRGHOV RI
VWDWLF EDFNJURXQG DW WKH SL[HO OHYHO WKHQ FRPSDUH QHZ IUDPHV
RI YLGHR WR WKHVH PRGHOV LQ RUGHU WR HVWLPDWH ZKLFK SL[HOV
GHSLFW PRYLQJ IRUHJURXQG :H XVH WKH EDFNJURXQG VXEWUDFWLRQ
WHFKQLTXH SURSRVHG E\ 6WDXIIHU DQG *ULPVRQ >@ ZKLFK
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PDLQWDLQV DQ DGDSWLYH *DXVVLDQ PL[WXUH PRGHO LQ ' FRORU
VSDFH IRU HYHU\ SL[HO 7KLV PHWKRG RIIHUV VRPH UREXVWQHVV
WR VKDGRZ HIIHFWV EHFDXVH RI WKH PXOWLPRGDO IRUP RI LWV
EDFNJURXQG PRGHO :H PHDVXUH D IRUHJURXQG UDWLR IRU HDFK
FDQGLGDWH ERXQGLQJ ER[ FRPSXWHG DV WKH UDWLR RI DOO SL[HOV
ZLWKLQ WKH ER[ WKDW DUH ODEHOHG DV IRUHJURXQG E\ WKLV PRGHO
(DFK RI WKH WKUHH GHWHFWLRQ FULWHULD SURGXFHV D UHDOYDOXHG
VFRUH WKDW LQGLFDWHV WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKDW FULWHULRQ LV
PHW IRU GHWHFWLRQ SRVLWLRQ !p WKH RXWSXW RI WKH 690 KXPDQ
FRQWRXU GHWHFWRU scont(!p) WKH SHUVSHFWLYH HUURU "per(!p) DQG
WKH IRUHJURXQG UDWLR rfore(!p) 7KH IXVHG GHWHFWLRQV UHVXOW IURP
D IXQFWLRQ f(scont(!p), "per(!p), rfore(!p)) PDSSLQJ DOO WKUHH
YDOXHV WR HLWKHU  GHWHFWLRQ RU  QR GHWHFWLRQ )RU UHDVRQV
RI FRPSXWDWLRQDO HIILFLHQF\ ZH GHFRPSRVH WKLV IXQFWLRQ LQWR
D FRPELQDWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO WKUHVKROGV DSSOLHG WR HDFK YDOXH
7KLV ZD\ ZH FDQ XVH D FDVFDGHG GHWHFWLRQ VWUDWHJ\ ZKHUH
WKH FRPSXWDWLRQDOO\ VLPSOHU FULWHULD IRUHJURXQG UDWLR DQG
SHUVSHFWLYH HUURU DUH HYDOXDWHG ILUVW LQ RUGHU WR UXOH RXW PRVW
FDQGLGDWH ERXQGLQJ ER[ SRVLWLRQV $V D UHVXOW WKH FRPSXWD
WLRQDOO\ H[SHQVLYH +2* IHDWXUHV PXVW RQO\ EH JHQHUDWHG DW
UHODWLYHO\ VSDUVH ORFDWLRQV DQG VFDOHV 7R DFKLHYH DGGLWLRQDO
VSHHGXS ZH XVH 'DOOH\¶V *38 LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI SDUDOOHOL]HG
+2* IHDWXUH FRPSXWDWLRQ >@ $OO WKUHH WKUHVKROGV IRU WKLV
PHWKRG ZHUH VHOHFWHG HPSLULFDOO\ IURP WUDLQLQJ GDWD
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR SHUVRQ GHWHFWLRQ ZH DOVR DWWHPSW WR FODVVLI\
HDFK GHWHFWLRQ E\ JHQGHU 7KLV FODVVLI HU LV REWDLQHG E\ UH
WUDLQLQJ D 690 GLVFULPLQDQW LQ +2* IHDWXUH VSDFH $V D
UHVXOW FODVVLILFDWLRQ LV EDVHG RQ FRQWRXU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV ZKLFK
DSSHDU WR FDSWXUH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW KDLU VW\OH FORWKLQJ VW\OH
DQG ERG\ IUDPH 6LQFH +2* IHDWXUHV DUH DOUHDG\ FRPSXWHG
GXULQJ GHWHFWLRQ SHUIRUPLQJ WKLV DGGLWLRQDO FODVVLILFDWLRQ LV
FRPSXWDWLRQDOO\ LQH[SHQVLYH
% *HQHUDWLYH $SSHDUDQFH 0RGHO
,Q RXU VHDUFK IUDPHZRUN WKH RSHUDWRU VSHFLILHV DQ DWWULEXWH
SURILOH LQFOXGLQJ VRPH VXEVHW RI WKH IROORZLQJ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
JHQGHU KDLU RU KDW FRORU FORWKLQJ FRORU DQG EDJ GHVFULSWLRQV
W\SH DQG FRORU *LYHQ D SDUWLFXODU DWWULEXWH SURILOH KRZHYHU
WKHUH LV TXLWH D ELW RI YDULDWLRQ LQ WKH ZD\ DQ LPDJH FKLS
PDQLIHVWV DV D VHW RI SL[HO YDOXHV GXH WR FKDQJHV LQ YLHZ
DQJOH OLJKWLQJ FRQGLWLRQV ERG\ W\SH FORWKLQJ DQG EDJ VW\OH
HWF ,Q RUGHU WR H[SODLQ WKLV H[SHFWHG YDULDWLRQ ZH IRUPXODWH
D JHQHUDWLYH SUREDELOLVWLF PRGHO WKDW JLYHV WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI
REVHUYLQJ D VHW RI SL[HO YDOXHV JLYHQ DQ DWWULEXWH SURILOH 7KLV
PRGHO KDV D KLHUDUFKLFDO VWUXFWXUH ZLWK NH\ IDFWRUV RI WKH
LPDJH IRUPDWLRQ HQFRGHG DV ODWHQW YDULDEOHV LQ WKH KLHUDUFK\
7KH PRGHO DV YLVXDOL]HG LQ )LJXUH  KDV WKH IROORZLQJ
VWUXFWXUH
/HW !A UHSUHVHQW WKH VHW RI DWWULEXWHV LQ WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH
FRPSULVHG RI D FROOHFWLRQ RI IODJV DQG UHDOYDOXHG FRORU
VSHFLILFDWLRQV 7KH I UVW OHYHO RI WKH PRGHO KLHUDUFK\ SDUWLWLRQV
WKH LPDJH FKLS LQWR LWV FRPSRQHQW SDUWV DV GHSLFWHG LQ )LJXUH
 KHDG WRUVR ORZHU ERG\ DQG RSWLRQDOO\ RQH RU PXOWLSOH
EDJV /HW YHFWRUV !zhead !ztorso !zlower DQG !zbag HQFRGH WKH '
SRVLWLRQV RI WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH FRPSRQHQWV DV UHFWDQJOHV ZLWKLQ















































)LJ  /HIW ,OOXVWUDWLRQ RI LPDJH FKLS GHFRPSRVLWLRQ LQWR LWV FRPSRQHQW
SDUWV 5LJKW *UDSKLFDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO JHQHUDWLYH PRGHO
1RGHV UHSUHVHQW YDULDEOHV HLWKHU GLUHFWO\ REVHUYHG VKDGHG ODWHQW RU VHW GXU
LQJ WUDLQLQJ ZKLOH DUURZV UHSUHVHQW GHSHQGHQFLHV (DFK LPDJH FKLS FRQWDLQV
K FRPSRQHQW SDUWV DQG Nk SL[HOV ZLWKLQ HDFK FRPSRQHQW
FRQWDLQ WKH ILUVW WKUHH SRVLWLRQ YHFWRUV DSSHQGHG WRJHWKHU 7KH
JHQHUDWLYH PRGHO MRLQWO\ VHOHFWV WKH EDVLF SRVLWLRQ YDOXHV IURP
D PXOWLYDULDWH *DXVVLDQ GLVWULEXWLRQ
!zbody ∼ N (!µ,Σ) 
ZKHUH SDUDPHWHU VHW θ = {!µ,Σ} FRQWDLQV WKH PHDQ H[SHFWHG
SRVLWLRQ VHW DQG WKH FRYDULDQFH PDWUL[ RI SRVLWLRQ FKDQJHV GXH
WR ERG\ FORWKLQJ DQG YLHZ DQJOH YDULDWLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ LI
DWWULEXWH VHW !A FRQWDLQV EDJ VSHFLILFDWLRQV HDFK EDJ SRVLWLRQ
LV GUDZQ IURP RQH RI WKUHH QRQSDUDPHWULF GLVWULEXWLRQV
GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH VSHFLILHG EDJ W\SH EDFNSDFN KDQGFDUULHG
EDJ RU UROOHG OXJJDJH 1RWH WKDW EDJ SRVLWLRQ LV GHILQHG WR
EH UHODWLYH WR WKH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH ERG\ FRPSRQHQWV VR WKDW WKH
JHQHUDWLRQ RI !zbody DQG !zbag YHFWRUV DUH QRW LQGHSHQGHQW
2QFH WKH FRPSRQHQW SRVLWLRQV KDYH EHHQ GHWHUPLQHG WKH
DWWULEXWH GHVFULSWLRQ JRYHUQV WKH FRORU DQG VKDSH LQIRUPDWLRQ
H[SUHVVHG E\ WKH SL[HO YDOXHV RI HDFK VXEUHJLRQ 7KH PRGHO
HPSOR\V D WHFKQLTXH VLPLODU WR ODWHQW 'LULFKOHW DOORFDWLRQ
/'$ >@ WR JHQHUDWH WKH PL[WXUH RI REVHUYHG FRORU RU
VKDSH LQIRUPDWLRQ $V DQ H[DPSOH FRQVLGHU WKH JHQHUDWLRQ
RI FRORU LQIRUPDWLRQ 7KH PRGHO GHILQHV D GLVFUHWH QXPEHU
RI FRORU ³WRSLFV´ ZKLFK DUH VHOHFWHG WR EH WZHOYH FRPPRQ
SHUFHSWXDO FRORUV EODFN ZKLWH JUD\ WDQ EURZQ \HOORZ
RUDQJH SLQN UHG JUHHQ EOXH SXUSOH (DFK ORFDO UHJLRQ k
ZLWKLQ D FRPSRQHQW LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ D GLVWULEXWLRQ RYHU WKH
FRORU WRSLFV !pik D GLPHQVLRQDO UHDOYDOXHG YHFWRU WKDW VXPV
WR RQH )LUVW WKH PRGHO GUDZV WKH FRORU WRSLF GLVWULEXWLRQ IURP
D 'LULFKOHW SULRU
!pik ∼ Dir(!αk) 
7KH 'LULFKOHW SULRU GLVWULEXWLRQ DFFRXQWV IRU YDULDWLRQ LQ WKH
FRORU PL[WXUH GXH WR IDFWRUV VXFK DV VW\OH PDWHULDO FRP
SRVLWLRQ VKDGRZ HIIHFWV RU REMHFW RFFOXVLRQ 7KH 'LULFKOHW
SDUDPHWHUV !αk DUH VHW EDVHG RQ WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH HJ D
³GDUN UHG WRUVR´ VSHFLI FDWLRQ PD\ KDYH D ELDV WRZDUG VHOHFWLRQ
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RI PL[WXUHV GRPLQDWHG E\ UHG DQG EODFN WRSLFV
2QFH WKH WRSLF GLVWULEXWLRQ KDV EHHQ VHOHFWHG HDFK SL[HO
ZLWKLQ WKH FRPSRQHQW UHJLRQ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ VHOHFWV D FRORU
WRSLF c DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ JLYHQ E\ !pik  )LQDOO\ WKH
SL[HO YDOXH LV GUDZQ IURP WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ FRORU WRSLF GHQVLW\
ZLWKLQ WKH WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO FRORU VSDFH ,I !x UHSUHVHQWV
D VLQJOH WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO SRLQW GHILQHG LQ KXHVDWXUDWLRQ
YDOXH +69 FRORU VSDFH WKH SUREDELOLW\ WKDW WKLV SRLQW ZDV
JHQHUDWHG E\ D FRORU GHQVLW\ FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ PHDQ !µc DQG
FRYDULDQFH PDWUL[ Σc LV JLYHQ E\ WKH TXDVL*DXVVLDQ H[SUHV
VLRQ
p(!x) = φ · exp
(




ZKHUH FRQVWDQW φ QRUPDOL]HV WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ DQG !d LV WKH
GLIIHUHQFH YHFWRU EHWZHHQ !x DQG !µc ZLWK WKH ILUVW HOHPHQW
d1 FRPSXWHG WR DFFRXQW IRU WKH F\FOLFDO QDWXUH RI WKH DQJXODU
KXH D[LV ZKLFK VSDQV IURP  WR 
d1(x1, µc1) = PRG(x1 − µc1 + 0.5, 1) − 0.5 
)RUPLQJ FRORU GHQVLWLHV LQ +69 VSDFH DV RSSRVHG WR 5*%
VSDFH SURYLGHV PRUH WROHUDQFH WR LQFRQVLVWHQW OLJKWLQJ FRQGL
WLRQV
$ VLPLODU JHQHUDWLYH PRGHO VWUXFWXUH DSSOLHV IRU VKDSH
LQIRUPDWLRQ ZLWKLQ HDFK FRPSRQHQW UHJLRQ ,QVWHDG RI XVLQJ
FRORU WRSLFV DQG REVHUYHG SL[HO YDOXHV WKH PRGHO UHSODFHV
WKHVH ZLWK ³VKDSH WRSLFV´ HJ PXOWLVFDOH JUDGLHQWV DQG
HGJHEDVHG SULPLWLYHV FHQWHUHG DURXQG HDFK SL[HO ORFDWLRQ ,Q
WKLV FDVH WKH 'LULFKOHW GLVWULEXWLRQ WKDW GULYHV WKH PRGHO LV
JRYHUQHG E\ WKH ODEHO RI WKH FRPSRQHQW KHDG WRUVR HWF
)LQDOO\ WKH UHDOYDOXHG JHQGHU VFRUH g SURGXFHG GXULQJ WKH
GHWHFWLRQ VWDJH LV DVVXPHG WR EH GUDZQ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ IURP WKH
UHVW RI WKH PRGHO DFFRUGLQJ WR DQ H[SRQHQWLDO GLVWULEXWLRQ
s(g) ∼ exp(λ) 
ZKHUH s(·) DGMXVWV WKH VLJQ RI WKH JHQGHU VFRUH DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH
JHQGHU ODEHO LQ WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH RU VHWV LW WR ]HUR LI JHQGHU
LV XQVSHFLILHG DQG SDUDPHWHU λ FRQWUROV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH
JHQGHU VSHFLILFDWLRQ UHODWLYH WR DOO RWKHU DWWULEXWH VSHFLILFDWLRQV
7KH PRGHO VWUXFWXUH GHVFULEHG DERYH KDV D VHW RI REVHUYHG
YDULDEOHV O WKH SL[HO YDOXHV HGJH SULPLWLYHV DQG DWWULEXWH
SURILOH D VHW RI KLGGHQ RU ODWHQW YDULDEOHV H WKH FRPSRQHQW
SRVLWLRQV WRSLF PL[WXUHV DQG WRSLF ODEHOV DQG D VHW RI OHDUQHG
PRGHO SDUDPHWHUV Θ GHVFULELQJ YDULRXV *DXVVLDQ 'LULFKOHW
H[SRQHQWLDO DQG QRQSDUDPHWULF GLVWULEXWLRQV :KHQ D JLYHQ
LPDJH FKLS LV HYDOXDWHG IRU LWV GHJUHH RI PDWFK WR D JLYHQ DW
WULEXWH SURILOH WKH PDWFK VFRUH m LV FRPSXWHG E\ PD[LPL]LQJ





7KLV LV HTXLYDOHQW WR HVWLPDWLQJ WKH PRVW OLNHO\ KLGGHQ VWDWHV WR
H[SODLQ WKH REVHUYHG LPDJH LI D KLJKSUREDELOLW\ H[SODQDWLRQ
1RWH WKDW LQ FRQWUDVW WR W\SLFDO /'$ PRGHOV WKH WRSLFV LQ WKLV PRGHO DUH
SUHGHILQHG DQG WKH SDUDPHWHUV RI WKH 'LULFKOHW GLVWULEXWLRQ DUH VHW DFFRUGLQJ
WR WKH DWWULEXWH GHVFULSWLRQ QRW OHDUQHG LQ DQ XQVXSHUYLVHG PDQQHU
H[LVWV WKDW LV FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH DWWULEXWH GHVFULSWLRQ DQG WKH
REVHUYHG YDOXHV WKLV ZLOO OHDG WR D KLJK PDWFK VFRUH 3DUWV RI
WKLV PD[LPXP OLNHOLKRRG RSWLPL]DWLRQ SUREOHP FDQ EH VROYHG
LQ FORVHGIRUP )RU WKH YDULDEOHV ZKLFK FDQQRW EH HVWLPDWHG
LQ FORVHG IRUP LH WKH FRPSRQHQW SRVLWLRQV ZH HPSOR\
D JUHHG\ LWHUDWHG FRQGLWLRQDO PRGHV ,&0 DOJRULWKP >@
ZKLFK LV LQLWLDOL]HG DW WKH PHDQ SRVLWLRQ YHFWRU DQG FRQYHUJHV
TXLFNO\ WR D ORFDO RSWLPXP
& 0RGHO ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ
$IWHU H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ ZLWK PXOWLSOH YHUVLRQV RI WKH PRGHO
IUDPHZRUN GHVFULEHG DERYH ZH VHOHFWHG D VLPSOLI HG LPSOH
PHQWDWLRQ IRU XVH LQ DOO H[SHULPHQWV GLVFXVVHG LQ WKLV SDSHU
7KLV LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ KDV WKH IROORZLQJ GHWDLOV 7KH FRPSR
QHQW SRVLWLRQ YDULDEOHV UHSUHVHQW ERXQGDU\ ORFDWLRQV DORQJ
WKH YHUWLFDO D[LV RQO\ ZKLOH SRVLWLRQV DORQJ WKH KRUL]RQWDO
D[LV DUH SUHGHWHUPLQHG DQG IL[HG $OO ORFDWLRQ YDULDEOHV DUH
H[SUHVVHG DV UDWLRV RI LPDJH FKLS KHLJKW LQ RUGHU WR PDNH
WKHLU GLVWULEXWLRQV LQYDULDQW WR UHVROXWLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKLV
YHUVLRQ RI WKH PRGHO LV OLPLWHG LQ VFRSH WR FRORU WRSLF PL[WXUH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV QRW VKDSH PL[WXUH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR
LPSURYH FRPSXWDWLRQDO HIILFLHQF\
,Q RUGHU WR OHDUQ WKH PRGHO SDUDPHWHUV ZH ODEHOHG JURXQG
WUXWK IRU WUDLQLQJ SXUSRVHV IURP VHYHUDO KXQGUHG LPDJHV VDP
SOHG IURP PXOWLSOH YLGHR GDWDVHWV 7KH ODEHOHG JURXQG WUXWK
LQFOXGHG FRPSRQHQW GHVFULSWLRQV SRVLWLRQV DQG SHUFHSWXDO
FRORU ODEHOV 7KH PHDQ YHFWRUV DQG FRYDULDQFH PDWULFHV RI DOO
PXOWLYDULDWH *DXVVLDQ GLVWULEXWLRQV ZHUH VHW XVLQJ PD[LPXP
OLNHOLKRRG HVWLPDWLRQ ZKLOH HDFK RI WKH WKUHH EDJ SRVLWLRQ
GLVWULEXWLRQV ZDV OHDUQHG GLUHFWO\ IURP ODEHOHG H[DPSOHV XVLQJ
NHUQHO GHQVLW\ HVWLPDWLRQ )LQDOO\ WKH PHWKRG IRU VHWWLQJ WKH
'LULFKOHW SDUDPHWHUV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH ZDV
VHOHFWHG WKURXJK HPSLULFDO WHVWLQJ
,,, ,17(5$&7,9( 6($5&+ 722/
7KH V\VWHP GHVFULEHG LQ WKLV SDSHU SURFHVVHV VXUYHLOODQFH
YLGHR LQ RUGHU WR H[WUDFW LQVWDQFHV RI PRYLQJ SHUVRQV DQG
WKHQ VWRUHV WKHVH LQVWDQFHV DV WLPH DQG ORFDWLRQ WDJJHG
GHVFULSWRUV WR D GDWDEDVH ,Q RUGHU WR DOORZ DQ RSHUDWRU WR
TXLFNO\ DQG HDVLO\ VHDUFK RYHU WKHVH UHFRUGV ZH FRQVWUXFWHG
DQ LQWHUDFWLYH VHDUFK WRRO WKDW RSHUDWHV GLUHFWO\ RQ WKH GDWDEDVH
7KH WRRO ZRUNV E\ WDNLQJ LQ D VHW RI VHDUFK FULWHULD WKURXJK
D JUDSKLFDO XVHU LQWHUIDFH UHWULHYLQJ DOO UHFRUGV IURP WKH
GHWHFWLRQ GDWDEDVH WKDW IDOO ZLWKLQ WKH VSHFLILHG WLPH SHULRG DQG
ORFDWLRQ DSSO\LQJ WKH SUREDELOLVWLF PRGHO GHVFULEHG LQ 6HFWLRQ
,,% WR VFRUH KRZ ZHOO HDFK UHFRUG PDWFKHV WKH VSHFLILHG
DWWULEXWH SURILOH UDQNLQJ WKHP LQ RUGHU RI EHVW PDWFK DQG
WKHQ GLVSOD\LQJ WKH WRS VHW RI PDWFKHV EDFN WR WKH RSHUDWRU
IRU IXUWKHU LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI WKH UHOHYDQW YLGHR
)LJXUH  VKRZV H[DPSOH VFUHHQVKRWV RI WKH VHDUFK WRRO
/DXQFKLQJ DQ DWWULEXWHEDVHG SHUVRQ VHDUFK EULQJV XS D VHDUFK
FULWHULD LQSXW PHQX GLYLGHG LQWR DQ DWWULEXWH SURILOH VHFWLRQ
XSSHU KDOI DQG D VHDUFK ORFDOL]DWLRQ VHFWLRQ ORZHU KDOI
:LWKLQ WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH VHFWLRQ WKH RSHUDWRU PD\ VSHFLI\
DQ\ VXEVHW RI DWWULEXWH RSWLRQV UHSUHVHQWHG LQ WKH PHQXV DQ\
LQSXWV QRW SURYLGHG E\ WKH RSHUDWRU DUH OHIW DV XQVSHFLILHG E\
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)LJ  6DPSOH VFUHHQVKRWV RI WKH LQWHUDFWLYH VHDUFK WRRO /HIW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RI GDWD IURP HDFK RI WKUHH FDPHUD YLHZV REWDLQHG IURP WKH L/,'6 GDWDVHW >@ FROOHFWHG DW *DWZLFN $LUSRUW LQ /RQGRQ
GHIDXOW PHDQLQJ WKH\ ZLOO QRW IDFWRU LQWR WKH VHDUFK UHVXOWV
$ JHQGHU PHQX DOORZV IRU VHOHFWLRQ RI PDOH RU IHPDOH $
KHDG FRORU PHQX DOORZV IRU VHOHFWLRQ RI FRORU LQIRUPDWLRQ
FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR HLWKHU KDW RU KDLU $ WRUVR FORWKLQJ FRORU PHQX
DOORZV VSHFLILFDWLRQ RI XSSHU ERG\ FORWKLQJ FRORUV ZKLFK
W\SLFDOO\ FRUUHVSRQG WR VKLUW FRDW RU EORXVH FRORU GHVFULSWLRQV
$ ORZHU ERG\ FORWKLQJ FRORU PHQX WDNHV LQ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW
SDQWV VKRUWV VNLUWV DQGRU SURPLQHQW VKRHV )LQDOO\ WKH EDJ
RSWLRQV DOORZ WKH XVHU WR VSHFLI\ RQH RU PRUH EDJV LQ WKH
SRVVHVVLRQ RI WKH SHUVRQRILQWHUHVW (DFK EDJ WDNHV D W\SH
GHVFULSWLRQ EDFNSDFN KDQGFDUULHG EDJ RU UROOHG OXJJDJH
LQ DGGLWLRQ WR FRORU SDWWHUQV $OO FRORU VHOHFWLRQV DUH PDGH
WKURXJK D SDOHWWH LQWHUIDFH WKDW DOORZV VHOHFWLRQ IURP DPRQJ
D UDQJH RI VKDGHV ZLWKLQ PXOWLSOH FRPPRQ SHUFHSWXDO FRORU
FDWHJRULHV
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH DWWULEXWH SURILOH WKH RSHUDWRU VHOHFWV D
VWDUW WLPH DQG HQG WLPH IRU FRQGXFWLQJ WKH VHDUFK ZKLFK PD\
VSDQ XS WR PXOWLSOH GD\V RI DUFKLYHG YLGHR 7KH RSHUDWRU PD\
DOVR FKRRVH WKH VXEVHW RI FDPHUD YLHZV RYHU ZKLFK WR VHDUFK
IRFXVLQJ LQ RQ SDUWLFXODU UHJLRQV ZLWKLQ LQGLYLGXDO FDPHUD
VFHQHV HJ GRRUZD\V RU SHGHVWULDQ SDVVDJHZD\V LI GHVLUHG
2QFH DOO DWWULEXWH DQG VHDUFK ORFDOL]DWLRQ FULWHULD KDV EHHQ
HQWHUHG WKH VHDUFK SURFHVV ODXQFKHV DQG WKH VRIWZDUH DFFHVVHV
WKH GHWHFWLRQ GDWDEDVH WR FRPSXWHV DOO UHOHYDQW PDWFK VFRUHV
7KH WLPH UHTXLUHG WR ILQLVK WKLV SURFHVVLQJ LV W\SLFDOO\ DW OHDVW
D IHZ VHFRQGV DQG VFDOHV LQ URXJK SURSRUWLRQ WR WKH DUHD
DQG WLPH ZLQGRZ RI WKH VHDUFK GHSHQGLQJ RQ YDULDWLRQV LQ
SHGHVWULDQ IUHTXHQF\
7KH VHDUFK UHVXOWV LQWHUIDFH KDV WKUHH SDQHOV DV GHSLFWHG
RQ WKH ULJKW VLGH RI )LJXUH  7KH ILUVW SDQHO FRQWDLQV D VHW
RI LPDJH FKLSV UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH WRS PDWFKHV WR WKH DWWULEXWH
VHDUFK FULWHULD 7KHVH FKLSV DUH ILOWHUHG WR DYRLG UHGXQGDQW
GLVSOD\V RI WKH VDPH SHUVRQ LQ FRQVHFXWLYH IUDPHV RI YLGHR
7KH RSHUDWRU PD\ VFUROO WKURXJK WKHVH LPDJH FKLS UHVXOWV DQG
FOLFN RQ DQ\ RI WKHP WR UHWULHYH WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ YLGHR
FRQWHQW 7KH VHFRQG SDQHO GLVSOD\V WKH YLGHR IUDPH IURP
ZKLFK WKH PDWFK ZDV GHWHFWHG DQG DOORZV WKH RSHUDWRU WR
YLHZ WKH YLGHR XVLQJ D VWDQGDUG VHW RI SOD\EDFN FRQWUROV
7KH WKLUG SDQHO GLVSOD\V ERWK D WLPHOLQH DQG D PDS RI WKH
IDFLOLW\ FRQWDLQLQJ HVWLPDWHG WLPHV DQG ORFDWLRQV IRU HDFK RI
WKH WRS PDWFKHV 7KH RSHUDWRU KDV WKH RSWLRQ WR UHWULHYH YLGHR
E\ VHOHFWLQJ DQ LQGLYLGXDO GHWHFWLRQ GLUHFWO\ IURP WKH PDS RU
IURP WKH WLPHOLQH UDWKHU WKDQ IURP WKH LPDJH FKLS VHW
$V LW LV VHW XS WKH VHDUFK WRRO SURYLGHV ERWK D FOHDU ZD\ IRU
XVHUV WR HQWHU VWUXFWXUHG VHDUFK TXHULHV DQG D PHFKDQLVP WR
H[SORUH SRWHQWLDO VLJKWLQJV RI D SHUVRQRILQWHUHVW WKURXJKRXW
DOO DYDLODEOH VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR QRWH WKDW LI
WKHUH LV D XVHIXO YLGHR GHWHFWLRQ LW ZLOO QRW DOZD\V DSSHDU DV
WKH ILUVW PRVW KLJKO\ VFRUHG LPDJH FKLS GXH WR LQDFFXUDFLHV
LQ ZLWQHVV GHVFULSWLRQV OLPLWDWLRQV LQ WKH W\SH RI DWWULEXWH
LQSXWV DFFHSWHG E\ WKH VRIWZDUH RU LPSHUIHFWLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH
JHQHUDWLYH DSSHDUDQFH PRGHO +RZHYHU LI WKH XVHIXO FRQWHQW
DSSHDUV VRPHZKHUH DPRQJ WKH WRS PDWFK UHVXOWV LW LV W\SLFDOO\
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D PXFK HDVLHU DQG TXLFNHU SURFHVV IRU DQ RSHUDWRU WR EURZVH
WKURXJK D VHW RI LPDJH FKLSV DQG IRFXV LQ RQ WKH UHOHYDQW
FRQWHQW WKDQ LW LV IRU WKDW RSHUDWRU WR PDQXDOO\ VFDQ ODUJH
DPRXQWV RI UDZ YLGHR
,9 (;3(5,0(17$/ 5(68/76
:H KDYH WULHG WKH VHDUFK WRRO GHVFULEHG DERYH RQ VHYHUDO
VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR GDWDVHWV LQFOXGLQJ WKH L/,'6 GDWDVHW >@
FROOHFWHG DW *DWZLFN $LUSRUW VDPSOH YLGHR FROOHFWHG DW D PDMRU
86 DLUSRUW DQG VDPSOH YLGHR FROOHFWHG DW VWUHHW LQWHUVHFWLRQV
E\ RXWGRRU ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW VXUYHLOODQFH FDPHUDV +RZHYHU
RXU DELOLW\ WR PHDVXUH SHUIRUPDQFH TXDQWLWDWLYHO\ LV OLPLWHG
E\ WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI GHWDLOHG JURXQG WUXWK IRU WKHVH GDWDVHWV
,Q RUGHU WR FRPSXWH WKH UHVXOWV GLVFXVVHG LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ ZH
VHOHFWHG D SDUWLFXODU DUHD VXUYHLOOHG GXULQJ WKH 86 DLUSRUW YLGHR
GDWD FROOHFWLRQ DQG ODEHOHG JURXQG WUXWK IRU DOO SHGHVWULDQ
DFWLYLW\ RFFXUULQJ ZLWKLQ WKDW DUHD RYHU D GHILQHG SHULRG
RI WLPH 7KH VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR RI WKLV DSSUR[LPDWHO\ 
VTXDUH PHWHU UHJLRQ KDV LPDJH UHVROXWLRQ DORQJ WKH KHLJKW
RI SHGHVWULDQV UDQJLQJ IURP DERXW  SL[HOV WR  SL[HOV
:H FROOHFWHG JURXQG WUXWK FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH ORFDWLRQ DQG
DWWULEXWHEDVHG DSSHDUDQFH RI HDFK SHUVRQ ZKR SDVVHG WKURXJK
WKLV UHJLRQ $QDO\]LQJ VDPSOHG IUDPHV RI YLGHR DW D UDWH RI 
+] WKHUH ZDV D WRWDO RI DSSUR[LPDWHO\  LQVWDQFHV LH
IUDPH DSSHDUDQFHV RI  XQLTXH SHGHVWULDQV REVHUYHG GXULQJ
JURXQG WUXWK ODEHOLQJ
,Q DGGLWLRQ ZH DOVR ODEHOHG WKH ORFDWLRQ RI HYHU\ SHGHVWULDQ
SDVVLQJ WKURXJK D W\SLFDO RXWGRRU VWUHHW VFHQH FDSWXUHG E\ ODZ
HQIRUFHPHQW VXUYHLOODQFH YLGHR 7KLV YLGHR FRQWDLQV H[DPSOHV
RI SHGHVWULDQV DW DERXW  WR  SL[HOV RI KHLJKW UHVROXWLRQ
DV ZHOO DV PRYLQJ YHKLFOHV :H DJDLQ JHQHUDWHG JURXQG WUXWK
DW D UDWH RI  +] FRYHULQJ DSSUR[LPDWHO\  LQVWDQFHV RI
 XQLTXH SHGHVWULDQV
$ 'HWHFWLRQ
7KH RXWSXW RI WKH PRYLQJ SHUVRQ GHWHFWLRQ DOJRULWKP GH
SHQGV XSRQ WKUHH WKUHVKROG YDOXHV FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH WKUHH
FULWHULD IRU GHWHFWLRQ GHVFULEHG LQ 6HFWLRQ ,,$ 9DU\LQJ WKHVH
WKUHVKROG YDOXHV DIIHFWV ERWK WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI GHWHFWLRQ 3'
DQG WKH IDOVH SRVLWLYH UDWH )35 7KHUHIRUH ZH FRQGXFWHG
D SDUDPHWHU VZHHSV IRU WKH LQGRRU DQG RXWGRRU VXUYHLOODQFH
YLGHR WR ILQG WKUHVKROG YDOXHV WKDW \LHOGHG WKH EHVW GHWHFWLRQ
SHUIRUPDQFH XVLQJ WKH JURXQG WUXWK GDWD GHVFULEHG DERYH WR
HYDOXDWH 3' DQG )35 PHWULFV )RU HDFK SHUVRQ SDVVLQJ WKURXJK
WKH UHJLRQ RI LQWHUHVW ZH FRXQWHG D FRUUHFW GHWHFWLRQ LI WKH
DOJRULWKP IODJJHG WKDW SHUVRQ LQ DW OHDVW RQH DQDO\]HG IUDPH
RI YLGHR 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG ZH FRXQWHG DQ\ GHWHFWLRQ WKDW
GLG QRW FRUUHVSRQG WR DQ HQWLUH SHUVRQ DV D IDOVH SRVLWLYH
7DEOH , VKRZV 3' DQG )35 IRU WKH VHOHFWHG GHWHFWLRQ WKUHVK
ROGV RI HDFK GDWDVHW 7KH DOJRULWKP DFKLHYHG WKH EHVW UHVXOWV RQ
WKH LQGRRU DLUSRUW YLGHR GHWHFWLQJ DQ LQVWDQFH RI DOPRVW HYHU\
SHGHVWULDQ ZKLOH SXOOLQJ LQ IDOVH SRVLWLYHV DW D UHODWLYHO\ ORZ
UDWH VR WKDW WKH\ FRQVWLWXWH D VPDOO SHUFHQWDJH RI UHFRUGV LQ WKH
GHWHFWLRQ GDWDEDVH 7KH RXWGRRU VFHQH SURYHG PRUH GLIILFXOW
IRU VHYHUDO UHDVRQV 6RPH RI WKH PLVVHG GHWHFWLRQV ZHUH
IURP SHGHVWULDQV ZKR QHYHU FRPSOHWHO\ HQWHU WKH VFHQH EHIRUH
7$%/( ,
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9LGHR GDWD 3' )35
$LUSRUW LQGRRU   SHU VHF
/DZ HQIRUFHPHQW RXWGRRU   SHU VHF
H[LWLQJ RU ZKR DSSHDU SDUWLDOO\ RFFOXGHG EHKLQG YHKLFOHV ,Q
DGGLWLRQ PRVW RI WKH IDOVH SRVLWLYHV ZHUH JHQHUDWHG E\ SDUWV RI
PRYLQJ YHKLFOHV RU E\ WUHHV EORZLQJ LQ WKH ZLQG FOXWWHU ZKLFK
LV QRW SUHVHQW LQ WKH LQGRRU VFHQH 2YHUDOO ZH IRXQG WKDW WKH
GHWHFWLRQ SURFHVV VXSSRUWV JRRG VHDUFK FDSDELOLW\ HVSHFLDOO\
ZKHQ WKH YLGHR FDSWXUHV D FRPSOHWH YLHZ RI WKH VXEMHFW EXW
WKDW WKH SHUIRUPDQFH GHSHQGV KHDYLO\ RQ WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI
WKH VFHQH
% $SSHDUDQFH 0RGHO
7KH SUREDELOLVWLF DSSHDUDQFH PRGHO LV D PHFKDQLVP WR VFRUH
WKH OLNHOLKRRG WKDW HDFK LPDJH FKLS GHSLFWV D SHUVRQ ZLWK WKH
VSHFLILHG DWWULEXWH VHW :KHQ WKH PRGHO IXQFWLRQV FRUUHFWO\ DOO
H[DPSOHV RI SHUVRQV PDWFKLQJ WKH SURYLGHG GHVFULSWLRQ ZLOO
DSSHDU DW WKH WRS RI WKH PDWFK OLVW ZKLFK LV UDQNHG LQ RUGHU
RI GHVFHQGLQJ OLNHOLKRRG VFRUHV 7R WHVW WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI
WKH PRGHO ZH UDQ PXOWLSOH VDPSOH VHDUFKHV RYHU WKH SRUWLRQ
RI YLGHR IRU ZKLFK ZH KDG JURXQG WUXWK ODEHOV 7KH DWWULEXWH
SURILOHV IRU HDFK RI HOHYHQ WHVW VHDUFKHV DUH OLVWHG LQ WKH
OHJHQG RI )LJXUH  WKHVH ZHUH VHOHFWHG DUELWUDULO\ E\ WDNLQJ
GHVFULSWLRQV IURP WKH JURXQG WUXWK ODEHOV WKDW PDWFKHG RQH
RU PRUH SHUVRQV ZKR DSSHDUHG ZLWKLQ WKH YLGHR H[FOXGLQJ
JHQGHU ZKLFK ZDV WHVWHG VHSDUDWHO\
)RU HDFK WHVW VHDUFK ZH JHQHUDWHG D SHUIRUPDQFH FXUYH
E\ YDU\LQJ WKH QXPEHU RI WRS VHDUFK UHVXOWV UHWXUQHG E\ WKH
VHDUFK $GGLQJ WR WKH QXPEHU RI UHVXOWV LQFUHDVHV WKH FKDQFH
RI ILQGLQJ DOO WUXH PDWFKHV EXW LW DOVR LQFUHDVHV WKH RFFXUUHQFH
RI IDOVH SRVLWLYHV 7KH \D[LV LQ )LJXUH  SORWV WKH UHFDOO RU
WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI DOO WUXH PDWFKHV UHWXUQHG E\ WKH VHDUFK
ZKLOH WKH [D[LV SORWV WKH QXPEHU RI UHWXUQHG IDOVH SRVLWLYHV
QRUPDOL]HG E\ WKH WRWDO QXPEHU RI IDOVH SRVLWLYH LQGLYLGXDOV
LQ WKH GDWDEDVH 1RWH WKDW E\ WKHVH PHWULFV DQ DOJRULWKP WKDW
DVVLJQHG UDQGRP PDWFK VFRUHV WR LPDJH FKLSV ZRXOG KDYH DQ
H[SHFWHG WUDGHRII UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH GRWWHG OLQH LQ )LJXUH 
$V H[SHFWHG DOO VHDUFK UHVXOWV XVLQJ WKH SURSRVHG PRGHO
SHUIRUP VLJQLILFDQWO\ EHWWHU WKDQ WKH UDQGRPVFRULQJ EDVHOLQH
+RZHYHU WKHUH LV QRWLFHDEOH YDULDWLRQ LQ HUURU UDWHV GHSHQGLQJ
RQ WKH SDUWLFXODU DWWULEXWH VHW )LYH RI WKH HOHYHQ VDPSOH
VHDUFKHV UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH UHG OLQH LQ )LJXUH  IRXQG DOO
WUXH PDWFKHV EHIRUH UHWXUQLQJ DQ\ IDOVH SRVLWLYHV 2WKHU VDPSOH
VHDUFKHV UHWXUQHG PXOWLSOH IDOVH SRVLWLYHV EHIRUH UHFRYHULQJ DOO
PDWFKHV 7KH PRUH VSHFLI F VHDUFK TXHULHV HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH
ZLWK RQO\ RQH WUXH PDWFK DPRQJ DOO SHGHVWULDQV WHQG WR
VKRZ EHWWHU UHVXOWV EHFDXVH WKHVH SURILOHV FRQWDLQ WKH PRVW
GLVFULPLQDWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG PRUH JHQHULF
GHVFULSWLRQV VHHP WR SXOO LQ VRPH IDOVH SRVLWLYHV DORQJ ZLWK
DOO RI WKH WUXH SRVLWLYHV
)LQDOO\ ZH DOVR HYDOXDWHG WKH DFFXUDF\ RI WKH JHQGHU
FODVVLILHU E\ WHVWLQJ LW RQ PXOWLSOH VXUYHLOODQFH GDWDVHWV :H
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Red and white torso / black pants
Black and tan torso / blue pants
Blue torso / black pants
White hair or hat / red torso
White torso / black pants
Brown torso / blue pants
Blond hair / black torso
Yellow torso / black pants / blue bag
Brown & white torso / blue pants / black bag
Brown torso / tan pants
Orange torso / black pants
Random selection
)LJ  3HUIRUPDQFH FXUYHV IRU HOHYHQ VDPSOH DWWULEXWHEDVHG VHDUFKHV
&XUYHV SORW UHFDOO \D[LV YV QRUPDOL]HG IDOVH SRVLWLYHV [D[LV 7KH GRWWHG
OLQH UHSUHVHQWV H[SHFWHG SHUIRUPDQFH RI D UDQGRP VHOHFWLRQ VHDUFK DOJRULWKP
7KH ILUVW ILYH VHDUFKHV LQ WKH OHJHQG KDYH FRPSOHWHO\ DFFXUDWH VHDUFK UHVXOWV
PHDVXUHG FRUUHFW FODVVLILFDWLRQ UDWHV UDQJLQJ IURP  WR
 :KLOH WKHVH UHVXOWV DUH IDU IURP SHUIHFW ZKHQ XVHG LQ
FRPELQDWLRQ ZLWK VWURQJHU DWWULEXWH FXHV WKH FODVVLILHU GRHV
WHQG WR PRYH PRUH PDWFKHV ZLWK WKH VSHFLILHG JHQGHU WRZDUG
WKH WRS RI WKH PDWFK OLVW 7KLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW LW PD\ DOVR EH
XVHIXO WR LQFOXGH RWKHU ³ZHDN´ FODVVLILHUV EDVHG RQ FRQWRXU
DQDO\VLV VXFK DV KHLJKW RU ERG\ IUDPH LQIRUPDWLRQ
9 ',6&866,21
7KH VHDUFK FDSDELOLWLHV GHVFULEHG LQ WKLV SDSHU SURYLGH
D XVHIXO ZD\ IRU VHFXULW\ SHUVRQQHO RU LQYHVWLJDWRUV WR VLIW
WKURXJK ODUJH TXDQWLWLHV RI YLGHR GDWD WR ILQG D SDUWLFXODU
SHUVRQRILQWHUHVW JLYHQ D UHFHQW REVHUYDWLRQ RU ZLWQHVV UHSRUW
GHVFULELQJ WKDW SHUVRQ 7KLV FDSDELOLW\ PD\ EH DSSOLHG LQ
WZR GLIIHUHQW PRGHV WR SHUIRUP UHDOWLPH PRQLWRULQJ IRU DQ\
SHUVRQV WKDW PDWFK DQ DWWULEXWH SURI OH HJ DW DOO HQWU\ZD\V WR
D IDFLOLW\ RU WR SHUIRUP IRUHQVLF VHDUFKHV RYHU DUFKLYHG YLGHR
GDWD ,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH VHDUFK WRRO SURYLGHV WKH RSHUDWRU ZLWK D
QXPEHU RI OHDGV WR SRWHQWLDOO\ YDOXDEOH DQG HDVLO\ DFFHVVLEOH
YLGHR FRQWHQW
+RZHYHU WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH VHDUFK DOJRULWKP FHUWDLQO\
GHSHQGV RQ ERWK WKH TXDOLW\ RI WKH UHFRUGHG YLGHR HVSHFLDOO\
WKH UHVROXWLRQ DQG ORRN DQJOH DQG WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH
HQYLURQPHQW XQGHU VXUYHLOODQFH )RU LQVWDQFH RXWGRRU YLHZV
RI VWUHHW LQWHUVHFWLRQV VHHP WR SUHVHQW PRUH FKDOOHQJHV WKDQ
UHODWLYHO\ FRQWUROOHG LQGRRU VHWWLQJV WKHUH DUH PRUH VRXUFHV
RI PRWLRQ VXFK DV YHKLFOHV DQG WUHHV EORZLQJ LQ WKH ZLQG
LQ DGGLWLRQ WR PRUH YDULDWLRQ LQ LOOXPLQDWLRQ FRQGLWLRQV GXH WR
QDWXUDO OLJKW FKDQJHV DQG EXLOGLQJ VKDGRZV $QRWKHU LPSRUWDQW
IDFWRU LV FURZG GHQVLW\ $ W\SLFDO VXEMHFW LQ DQ\ JLYHQ IUDPH
RI YLGHR HYDOXDWHG LQ WKLV ZRUN KDV D KLJK OLNHOLKRRG RI DW
OHDVW VRPH W\SH RI SDUWLDO RFFOXVLRQ IURP RWKHU PRYHUV RU
VWDWLF REMHFWV KRZHYHU WKH YLGHR GDWDVHW GRHV QRW FRQWDLQ VROLG
PDVVHV RI SHRSOH ZKLFK ZRXOG PDNH VXFFHVVIXO GHWHFWLRQ DQG
DQDO\VLV PXFK PRUH GLIILFXOW ,Q DGGLWLRQ GLIIHUHQW ORFDWLRQV
PD\ H[KLELW VXIILFLHQWO\ GLIIHUHQW FORWKLQJ VW\OHV WR GHJUDGH WKH
DFFXUDF\ RI WKH SUREDELOLVWLF DSSHDUDQFH PRGHO :KHQ WKLV LV
WKH FDVH WKH PRGHO PD\ EH UHWUDLQHG GLUHFWO\ RQ QHZ DQG
PRUH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH VDPSOH GDWD
:H KDYH FRQVLGHUHG VHYHUDO H[WHQVLRQV WR WKLV ZRUN )HHG
EDFN IURP HQG XVHUV LQGLFDWHV WKDW LW ZRXOG EH XVHIXO WR H[WHQG
WKH VHDUFK FDSDELOLWLHV WR YHKLFOH GHVFULSWLRQV DW WKH OHYHO RI
FRORU DQG JHQHULF W\SH VHGDQ WUXFN 689 HWF ,W ZRXOG DOVR
EH DGYDQWDJHRXV WR VHDUFK RYHU PRWLRQ RU DFWLRQ SULPLWLYHV
VXFK DV D SHUVRQ UXQQLQJ LQ D VSHFLI HG GLUHFWLRQ RU D SHUVRQ
HQWHULQJ RU H[LWLQJ D YHKLFOH )LQDOO\ ZH KDYH EHHQ ZRUNLQJ
RQ LQWHJUDWLQJ WKH VHDUFK FDSDELOLWLHV LQWR D PRUH JHQHUDO
VLWXDWLRQDO DZDUHQHVV WRRO IRU VHFXULW\ DQG LQYHVWLJDWLRQ ZKLFK
ZLOO DOORZ PXOWLSOH XVHUV WR DFFHVV YLGHR DQG SHUIRUP DQG
VKDUH FRQWHQW VHDUFKHV RYHU D ZHEEDVHG LQWHUIDFH
$&.12:/('*0(176
7KLV ZRUN ZDV SDUWLDOO\ VSRQVRUHG E\ -DODO 0DSDU DW WKH
'HSDUWPHQW RI +RPHODQG 6HFXULW\ 6FLHQFH DQG 7HFKQRORJ\
'LUHFWRUDWH
5()(5(1&(6
>@ - 9ODKRV ³6XUYHLOODQFH VRFLHW\ 1HZ KLJKWHFK FDPHUDV DUH ZDWFKLQJ
\RX´ 3RSXODU 0HFKDQLFV -DQXDU\ 
>@ 1 *DJYDQL ³&KDOOHQJHV LQ YLGHR DQDO\WLFV´ LQ $GYDQFHV LQ 3DWWHUQ
5HFRJQLWLRQ (PEHGGHG &RPSXWHU 9LVLRQ  FK  SS ±
>@ - %R\G DQG - /LWWOH ³%LRPHWULF JDLW UHFRJQLWLRQ´ LQ $GYDQFHG 6WXGLHV
LQ %LRPHWULFV 5HYLVHG 6HOHFWHG /HFWXUHV DQG 3DSHUV VHU /HFWXUH 1RWHV
LQ &RPSXWHU 6FLHQFH 0 7LVWDUHOOL - %LJXQ DQG ( *URVVR (GV 
YRO  SS ±
>@ 3 3KLOOLSV 3 )O\QQ 7 6FUXJJV . %RZ\HU - &KDQJ . +RIIPDQ
- 0DUTXHV - 0LQ DQG : :RUHN ³2YHUYLHZ RI WKH IDFH UHFRJQLWLRQ
JUDQG FKDOOHQJH´ LQ 3URFHHGLQJV RI ,((( &RQIHUHQFH RQ &RPSXWHU
9LVLRQ DQG 3DWWHUQ 5HFRJQLWLRQ 
>@ 3 3KLOOLSV ³2YHUYLHZ RI WKH PXOWLSOH ELRPHWULF JUDQG FKDOOHQJH
YHUVLRQ ´ LQ 0%*& :RUNVKRS 'HFHPEHU  >2QOLQH@ $YDLODEOH
KWWSZZZQLVWJRYLWOLDGLJPEJFSUHVHQWDWLRQVFIP
>@ ²² ³0EJF VWLOO IDFH FKDOOHQJH YHUVLRQ  SUHOLPLQDU\ UHVXOWV´
LQ 0%*& :RUNVKRS 'HFHPEHU  >2QOLQH@ $YDLODEOH
KWWSZZZQLVWJRYLWOLDGLJPEJFSUHVHQWDWLRQVFIP
>@ ' 9DTXHUR 5 )HULV ' 7UDQ / %URZQ $ +DPSDSXU DQG 0 7XUN
³$WWULEXWHEDVHG SHRSOH VHDUFK LQ VXUYHLOODQFH HQYLURQPHQWV´ LQ 3UR
FHHGLQJV RI ,((( :RUNVKRS RQ $SSOLFDWLRQV RI &RPSXWHU 9LVLRQ 
>@ 0 'HPLUNXV . *DUJ DQG 6 *XOHU ³$XWRPDWHG SHUVRQ FDWHJRUL]DWLRQ
IRU YLGHR VXUYHLOODQFH XVLQJ VRIW ELRPHWULFV´ LQ 3URFHHGLQJV RI 63,(
%LRPHWULF 7HFKQRORJ\ IRU +XPDQ ,GHQWLI FDWLRQ 9,, 
>@ 1 'DODO DQG % 7ULJJV ³+LVWRJUDPV RI RULHQWHG JUDGLHQWV IRU KXPDQ
GHWHFWLRQ´ LQ 3URFHHGLQJV RI ,((( &RQIHUHQFH RQ &RPSXWHU 9LVLRQ DQG
3DWWHUQ 5HFRJQLWLRQ 
>@ ; /LX 3 7X - 5LWWVFKHU $ 3HUHUD DQG 1 .UDKQVWRHYHU ³'HWHFWLQJ
DQG FRXQWLQJ SHRSOH LQ VXUYHLOODQFH DSSOLFDWLRQV´ LQ ,((( &RQIHUHQFH
RQ $GYDQFHG 9LGHR DQG 6LJQDO %DVHG 6XUYHLOODQFH 
>@ & 6WDXIIHU DQG : *ULPVRQ ³$GDSWLYH EDFNJURXQG PL[WXUH PRGHOV IRU
UHDOWLPH WUDFNLQJ´ LQ 3URFHHGLQJV RI ,((( &RQIHUHQFH RQ &RPSXWHU
9LVLRQ DQG 3DWWHUQ 5HFRJQLWLRQ 
>@ * 'DOOH\ ³,PSURYHG UREXVWQHVV DQG HIILFLHQF\ IRU DXWRPDWLF YLVXDO VLWH
PRQLWRULQJ´ 3K' GLVVHUWDWLRQ 0DVVDFKXVHWWV ,QVWLWXWH RI 7HFKQRORJ\
'HSW RI (OHFWULFDO (QJLQHHULQJ DQG &RPSXWHU 6FLHQFH 
>@ ' %OHL $ 1J DQG 0 -RUGDQ ³/DWHQW 'LULFKOHW DOORFDWLRQ´ -RXUQDO RI
0DFKLQH /HDUQLQJ 5HVHDUFK YRO  SS ± -DQXDU\ 
>@ - +XDQJ 4 0RUULV DQG % )UH\ ³,WHUDWHG FRQGLWLRQDO PRGHV IRU FURVV
K\EULGL]DWLRQ FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ '1$ PLFURDUUD\ GDWD´ 8QLYHUVLW\ RI
7RURQWR 7HFK 5HS 
>@ . 6DJH $ 1LOVNL DQG , 6LOOHWW ³/DWHVW GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKH LOLGV
SHUIRUPDQFH VWDQGDUG 1HZ LPDJLQJ PRGDOLWLHV´ ,((( $HURVSDFH DQG
(OHFWURQLF V\VWHPV 0DJD]LQH YRO  -XO\ 
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Abstract—This paper investigates new methods to measure,
quantify and evaluate the security posture of human organi-
zations especially within large corporations and government
agencies. Computer security is not just about technology and
systems. It is also about the people that use those systems and
how their vulnerable behaviors can lead to exploitation. We focus
on measuring enterprise-level susceptibility to phishing attacks.
Results of experiments conducted at Columbia University and
the system used to conduct the experiments are presented that
show how the system can also be effective for training users. We
include a description of follow-on work that has been proposed
to DHS that aims to measure and improve the security posture of
government departments and agencies, as well as for comparing
security postures of individual agencies against one another.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lord Kelvin taught us that without numbers there is no sci-
ence. Indeed, quantification lies at the very heart of scientific
progress. Without measurement, one cannot know what has
been learned or achieved and whether our knowledge has been
advanced or progress has been made. The field of computer
and information security requires the foundational science that
provides the means for assessing the strength of organizational
security postures. For the Department of Homeland Security
needs, solid metrics may be applied as a means of assessing
the strength of one organization relative to others, and to help
identify vulnerabilities.
There are a few notable successes in the field of computer
security where metrics have been well established and prof-
itably applied to practical technologies with mathematically
provable security properties. Cryptography has provided tools
for researchers and developers to devise many practical and
widely deployed technologies that provide for confidentiality.
The formal analysis of the hardness of certain computational
problems establishes a metric to judge the strength of an
encryption scheme based upon key length, for example. How-
ever, cryptography alone does not provide all of the security
guarantees we may want. Other areas of computer security
have provided metrics to evaluate the relative merits of specific
technologies, such as detection accuracy rates of competing in-
trusion detection systems. Computer security is not just about
technology and systems, but must also take into consideration
the people and processes that rely on the systems. In this work,
we propose an approach to measuring organizational security
and educating users that relies on mimicking attackers’ actions
in social attacks.
Social attacks include those that occur when an attacker
uses any of a variety social attack vectors that may range
from email and telephone, to in-person encounters. According
to the 2010 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report [2],
social attacks were used in 28% of the breaches for 2009 and
nearly a quarter of these attacks occurred due to phishing.
In these types of attacks, victims are sent spoofed emails
that appear to be benign notifications from a bank, a social
networking site, or a software upgrade. When victims take
the bait, they are often greeted with some form of malicious
software that attempts to install itself on victim’s machine.
Although there have been many technological advances that
seem to hold promise in stopping these attacks, so far, none
of them have proven 100% effective allowing the problem to
continue. In fact, the vulnerability posed by phishing is often
used effectively in the largest, most costly attacks happening
today, like the recent attack on RSA [3].
Although the primary focus of the work is on measuring
organizational security, the results suggest that the system also
provides utility in training users. The defense approach we are
advocating in this paper involves better educating users to be
cautious of suspicious emails. Traditional training techniques
can be beneficial, but they are often not enough. Our technique
involves testing users’ vulnerability using a variety of decoy
emails; those that fall victim to our phony phishing attacks are
informed so that they may learn and change their behavior.
Subsequent tests of the same users show that this method
works, although sometimes it takes several iterations of testing
and teaching.
How a user responds to security significant events is also an
important consideration for organizational security. For exam-
ple, if someone receives a spear phishing email, how do they
handle it? They could simply delete it, but optimally, they may
report it so that appropriate actions are put in place to protect
other users. The processes that an organization has in place and
how they are socialized are essential for strong defense. The
proposed system has been designed to automatically monitor
emails sent to determine when a user falls for them, but it
can also be used to test user responses to security events, an
area that often gets little attention. These metrics may be used
to evaluate and quantitatively determine the effectiveness of
organizational policies and reporting processes.
A. Summary of Results
Experiments were conducted at Columbia University over
the course of a year with a randomly selected group of 4000
unwitting students, staff, and faculty. Each of the study’s
participants were sent one of four types of phony phishing
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emails modeled after real phishing emails. The emails included
attachments, embedded URLs, and forms to obtain user cre-
dentials. The experiments began with 500 emails being sent for
each of the four types. Users that fell for the phony phishing
emails were presented with messages informing them that
their behavior made them particularly vulnerable to phishing
attacks. Only users that fell for the phony phishing emails
were selected for the next round in which they were sent a
variation of the phony phishing email several weeks later. In
summary, it took a total of four rounds before all users were
able to identify the emails as being potentially malicious. The
experiment was then repeated with a new group of 2000 of
participants and phony phishing emails. The results of both
experiments suggest that decoy technology can be used for
training users to be cognizant of potential threats and that it can
provide useful metrics for assessing organizational security.
Applying the same set measurements laterally across multiple
organizations can be useful in measuring one organization’s
security posture relative to another’s.
B. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II contains a description of related work. Section III contains
a description of the proposed system that was used to conduct
the experiments. Section III provides the details of the
experimental analysis and results. Section V provides an
overview on how the system and approach can provide utility
to the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, Section VI
describes areas requiring further research.
II. RELATED WORK
The computer security field demand for techniques to eval-
uate and compare security designs and organizations. Many
techniques have been proposed and explored [1], but these
typically focus on systems and technologies rather than people.
Our work aims to demonstrate techniques aimed at measuring
organizational security through its people rather than just with
the technology on which they rely.
The proposed system is designed for educating users and
measuring organizational security using decoy emails. Tra-
ditional security training classes can be beneficial for or-
ganizations, but they are not enough and there are more
effective methods [4]. Our technique involves testing users’
vulnerability using a variety of decoy emails; those that fall
victim to our phony phishing attacks are informed so that they
may learn and change their behavior. Traditional approaches
for training users about the threat posed by phishing rely
on classes and informational warnings. Efforts to raise user
awareness have focused on testing users to demonstrate their
vulnerability [5]. Some tools have been created to support the
sending of fake phishing emails for purposes of pen testing and
training [6], [7], but these rely on an administrator to manually
construct and send the emails to targeted individuals. None
of these tools focus on the development of formal metrics
for measuring organizational security such that they can be
used for relative comparisons for comparing one organization
against another.
A similar study was conducted at Indiana University, which
involved social phishing and spoofing [8]. As part of the
study, the researchers launched harmless phishing attacks on
the students, specifically targeting students aged 18-24. The
experiment was performed with intent to show that social
context can be used in effective phishing. Unlike our efforts,
they did not focus on how useful metrics could be obtained
from the experiments or on techniques for improving an
organizational security posture.
The Honeynet project titled Know your enemy provides
practical information on the practice of phishing and draws
on data collected by the German Honeynet Project and UK
Honeynet Project [9]. This paper discusses on the various
techniques and tools used by the phishers, providing three
examples of empirical research where real-world phishing
attacks were captured using a Honeynet.
III. PHONY PHISH SYSTEM
The goal of the Phony Phish System is to provide an
automatic means to generate and send benign phishing emails
that can be used to measure an organization’s security and
educate users. The system consists of several components as
shown in Figure 1.
a) Crawler Module:: This component was designed to
crawl a directory and obtain a list of target identities to
perform the experiments on. For the experiments described
in IV, this module was used to search the Columbia University
directory, select users, their role within the university, and
which department they belong to.
b) Email Generator:: The email generator integrates all
of the components and was used to deliver emails for the
experiments. This component takes real email as input and
performs processing on them to change entity names. For this
task, we used the Stanford Named Entity Recognizer1. The
email generator component also functions to anonymize user
identify information through the use of MD5 hashes. For the
generation of beacon’ed documents, the email generator relies
on the Decoy Document Distributor described in [10].
c) Web Application:: A web application is used to collect
user responses when they click on links and submit forms
containing credentials. It tracks responses using a base 64
encoded query string that is tied to user requests. The system
does not the store the identify of users, only the time at which
the link was clicked, the department that the user belongs to,
and the role of a user within the organization.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Experiments were conducted by sending 500 emails for
each of four different types of decoy emails. Using standard
statistical techniques [11], this sample size was determined to
be significant for measuring a single population parameter (i.e.,
will a user open an email) with a 5% margin of error and 95%
1http://nlp.stanford.edu/ner/index.shtml
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Fig. 1. Components of the Phony Phish System.
confidence for the approximately 70,000 IDs in the Columbia
University directory. A second consideration for the choice of
using 500 was for practical reasons. Our intent was to have
a sample size large enough to draw scientifically significant
conclusions without burdening an unnecessary number of
subjects. Although we had permission from the university, and
the approval of the Columbia University Institutional Review
Board, the subjects were unwitting participants. The nature of
this kind of experiment has the potential to cost users in both
time and aggravation. Given that this was our first attempt
at such an experiment, we decided we would start with 500
emails for each of the four types and adjust as necessary.
The decoy emails were modeled after various types of
phishing attacks that occur in the wild. All of the emails were
sent using an external email account from a popular webmail
provider. Users that fell victim to the phony phishing emails
were presented with the following message:
The Columbia University IDS Lab is conducting experiments
designed to measure the security posture of large organizations
and to educate users about safe practices so that they avoid
falling prey to malicious emails. The emails automatically
generated and sent to users of Columbias network and email
system are designed to test whether users violate basic security
policies. Although our emails are completely benign, please
be aware that many emails are sent that are designed to trick
unsuspecting users into giving up identity information.
The four different types of emails and their results are sum-
marized below:
• Email with internal URLs: The content of these emails
were from email received with an external source, but the
URLs were changed to point to our IDS severs. The goal
of these emails were to see how many users bothered to
look at the address of the recipient before opening the
email.
• Email with external URLs: The content of these emails
was modified from emails received with an external
source. The emails were designed to lure those interested
in obtaining the Apple iPad. The URLs were changed to
point to our external servers in the .info domain.
• Forms to obtain credentials: The content of these emails
contained links to forms asking users for credentials
to see how many users were willing to expose their
credentials. Credentials were not stored.
• Beacon Documents: These emails contained PDF attach-
ments that emitted a beacon to our servers when opened.
The beacons were designed so that every user emitted a
unique response enabling us to track them. An evaluation
of the beacons is provided in [10].
A. Result Summary
Table I and Table II provide an overview of all of the results
obtained from two rounds of experiments. Over the course of
several weeks, offenders were repeatedly targeted until they
stopped falling victim. The results between the two rounds of
experiments were fairly consistent. The most important point
that can be gleaned from the data:
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TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF RESPONSES FOR EACH ROUND FOR THE FIRST EXPERIMENT TO MEASURE THE USER RESPONSE TO PHONY PHISH.
Decoy Type 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round
Email with internal URLs 52 2 0 NA
Email with external URLs 177 15 1 0
Forms to obtain credentials2 39/20 4/1 0 NA
Beacon Documents 45 0 NA NA
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF RESPONSES FOR EACH ROUND FOR THE SECOND EXPERIMENT TO MEASURE THE USER RESPONSE TO PHONY PHISH.
Decoy Type 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round
Email with internal URLs 69 7 1 0
Email with external URLs 176 10 3 0
Forms to obtain credentials 69/50 10/9 0 NA
Beacon Documents 71 2 0 NA
In all cases, users can be trained to be cautious of
suspicious looking emails, but sometimes it takes several
iterations of testing. In our experiments, the slowest
learners took at most four iterations as shown in Table
I and Table II.
Another observation from Table I and Table II is that it
appears users are less likely to respond to emails that appear
to be from internal sources, but actually have external sender
addresses. These emails were indeed suspicious, but we do
not have a good way to account for the differences in the
content. For example, the emails with external URLs (row 2)
pertain to the Apple iPad. At the time the emails were sent
out, the emails would have been enticing to the masses (i.e.,
the iPad was being released). On the other hand, the emails
with internal URLs (row 1) resembled those distributed by the
university, and are less enticing to the masses. Hence, there
is insufficient data to make any conclusion concerning these
differences.
Another point regarding Table I and Table II is that the
number of users that actually entered their credentials to the
bogus forms seemed alarmingly high (row 3). The values in
each of the columns indicate the number of users that clicked
on the links followed by the number that actually entered
credentials. We did not record the credentials and we did
not validate them to ensure they were valid. However, we
believe it is likely that at least some of the users entered valid
credentials.
Table III presents a role-wise breakdown of the results. It
can be seen that students are more susceptible to the phishing
emails than university staff. This may be attributed to the fact
that student population flux is high and the tendency to adhere
to Columbia University policies may not be uniform. Staff
awareness of, and adherence to security policies is greater
than that of the students, who may simply have no regard
for them. A similar observation can be made in case of decoy
documents. There exists a Columbia University policy that
prohibits columbia from downloading documents originating
from unknown email addresses. The results suggest that the
policy may be regarded more highly by the staff population
than the student population. Table IV provides the school-wise
breakdown of the results. It is evident from the table that there
is almost a uniform distribution of vulnerable users across the
schools affiliated with the university.
Table V provides staff-wise breakdown of the results ob-
tained. One observation that can be made from these results
are that non-academic staff are more vulnerable to phishing
attacks than the academic staff.
B. Challenges
One of the challenges in conducting these studies lies in
managing the user discontent that is generated as a result of
selecting users to participate unwittingly. Despite the messages
that were generated to describe the nature of the experiments
and the benefit they may bring, some users still had issue.
The largest challenge for us was in accommodating the users
that were not so easily fooled by the fake phishing emails, or
who correctly identified them as being suspicious. Unlike the
users that did fall for the phony phishing emails and who were
presented with messages describing the experiments, these
users were not made aware of the study. Consequently, some of
them notified the university, which required us to make contact
with them and alleviate their concerns on an individual basis.
In future studies, we may notify study participants by email
after the study is complete to mitigate this challenge.
Another challenged we faced was the confusion that arose
due to the generated emails and their similarity to real emails.
Since the generated emails were mined from Columbia servers,
there was a high likelihood that the content and themes might
be among those currently circulating. To overcome the issue
we applied natural language processing techniques to modify
themes.
V. UTILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
The Department of Homeland Security has the lead re-
sponsibility for securing the nations information technology
infrastructure for public, private, and international entities.
This goal cannot be achieved solely through technological
improvements, but must also take into consideration the people
and processes that rely on the technology. The proposed
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TABLE III
ROLE WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
Role 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Students 11.6 48.8 14.4 36.5
Staffs 19.6 21.6 12.8 4
TABLE IV
SCHOOL WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
School 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Fu Foundation 24.1 30.5 21.7 9.4
GSB 13.7 2.8 16.4 7.9
Columbia College 6.8 NA 8.2 34.5
School of social work 6.8 11.1 3.2 1.6
Grad-Arts and sciences 10.4 11.1 21.7 18.8
School of law 6.8 21.6 3.2 NA
Continuing Education 6.8 2.8 8.2 7.9
General Studies 3.4 11.1 3.2 4.7
School of public health 10.4 5.6 6.6 9.4
School of Nursing 3.4 NA NA NA
College of dental medicine 3.4 5.6 NA NA
SIPA NA 11.1 12.8 NA
College of Physicians NA NA NA 1.6
TABLE V
STAFF ROLE WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
Staff Role 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Professor/Asst Prof 16.3 18.8 48.2 42.9
Postdoc 12.2 27.8 11.1 NA
Manager NA 15.6 3.7 NA
Staffs 71.4 40.6 37 57.1
system focuses on measuring and improving the security pos-
ture of organizations through their people. A fully developed
production system that extends upon the one proposed within
this work could be used to support the DHS mission of
securing government departments and agencies. The proposed
system could provide DHS with a means of assessing the
security posture of individual departments and agencies as
well as for comparing security postures of individual agencies
against one another.
VI. OPEN PROBLEMS: BELIEVABILITY OF BOGUS
PHISHING EMAILS
The success of the system relies on its ability to synthesize
emails that are semantically equivalent to real phishing emails.
Depending on the goals, resources, and sophistication of at-
tackers, phishing emails may vary in their level of believability
to a user and ability to bypass traditional security means. The
least sophisticated phishing attacks are those aimed at tricking
the largest sets of recipients and are sent out across the net
broadly. They often contain a common invariant or signature
that allows them to be detected by email spam filters, which are
commonly deployed at an organizations email gateway. They
might also be obvious by direct observation of the individuals
receiving, making them easily avoidable. As the specificity
of targeting increases to specific companies, organizations
within a company, or at the extreme, an individual (i.e.,
spear phishing), the believability of these emails increases,
making them more likely to bypass detection by an individual.
Our initial approach has focused on constructing generative
models for phishing emails using natural language processing
and statistical techniques. So far, we have had success in
modeling the least sophisticated attacks. Our future efforts
will focus on generative models for the automated creation
of more targeted spear phishing attacks. Developing a means
to automatically create fake spear phishing emails remains an
open problem. Successfully solving it requires addressing the
fundamental properties for creating decoy-based systems that
include variability, believability, enticingness, detectability,
differentiability, and non-interference [10].
VII. CONCLUSION
The previous sections provided an overview of our system
designed to create phony phishing emails. We presented the
results of two rounds of experiments conducted at Columbia
University in which approximately 4000 staff members and
students were targeted for training using the bogus phishing
emails. The results presented in the previous section sug-
gest that users can be trained using decoy technology to
be cognizant of potential threats. Applying the same set of
measurements laterally across multiple organizations can be a
useful in measuring one organization’s security posture relative
to another’s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This material is based on research partially sponsored by
DARPA under the ADAMS program grant number W911-NF-
11-1-0140 and from NSF under CCF grant 0950373.
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 5, Article 2 (May 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
REFERENCES
[1] S. Stolfo, S. Bellovin, and D. Evans, “Measuring security,” IEEE
Security & Privacy Magazine, pp. 72–77, 2011.
[2] W. Baker, M. Goudie, A. Hutton, C. D. Hylender, J. Niemantsverdriet,
C. Novak, D. Ostertag, C. Porter, M. Rosen, B. Sartin, and P. Tippett,
“2010 Data Breach Report,” Verizon Risk Team and the United States
Secret Service, Technical report, 2010.
[3] E. Mills. (2011, April) Attack on rsa used zero-day flash exploit in
excel. CNET. [Online]. Available: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080
3-20051071-245.html
[4] P. Kumaraguru, Y. Rhee, A. Acquisti, L. F. Cranor, J. Hong, and
E. Nunge, “Protecting people from phishing: The design and evaluation
of an embedded training email system,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human factors in computing systems (CHI ’07), San Jose,
California, 2007.
[5] New York State Office of Cyber Security & Critical Infrastructure Co-
ordination, “Gone phishing,” A Briefing on the Anti-Phishing Exercise
Initiative for New York State Government. Aggregate Exercise Results
for public release., 2005.
[6] Core Security. (2010) Core impact pro. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.coresecurity.com/
[7] Phishme.com. (2011) Phishme.com. [Online]. Available: http://www.
phishme.com/
[8] T. N. Jagatic, N. A. Johnson, M. Jakobsson, and F. Menczer, “Social
phishing,” Commun. ACM, vol. 50, pp. 94–100, October 2007. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1290958.1290968
[9] S. M. David Watson, Thorsten Holz. (2008) The honeynet project.
[Online]. Available: http://www.honeynet.org/papers/phishing/
[10] B. M. Bowen, S. Hershkop, A. D. Keromytis, and S. J. Stolfo, “Baiting
inside attackers using decoy documents,” in In Proceedings of the 5th
International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Communica-
tion Networks (SecureComm 2009), September 2009.
[11] R. V. Krejcie and D. W. Morgan, “Determining sample size for research
activities,” Educational and psychological measurement, vol. 30, pp.
607–610, 1970.
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 5, Article 2 (May 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Brian M. Bowen is a principal member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories, where  he 
has worked since 2002. He is currently working on the  DHS  National Cyber Protection System along 
with other national security related projects. He  has a broad range  of experience that includes software 
engineering, enterprise-level security architecture, and security related R&D. Brian holds a Ph.D. in 
Computer Science from Columbia University. He may be contacted at bmbowen@sandia.gov. 
Salvatore J. Stolfo  is professor of computer science at Columbia University. He  received his  PhD from 
NYU Courant Institute in 1979 and has been on the  faculty of Columbia ever since. He  has published 
several books and well over 200 scientific papers  since  then, several winning best paper awards, in the 
areas of parallel computing, AI  knowledge-based systems, data mining and most recently computer 
security and intrusion detection systems.
Ramaswamy Devarajan is analyst developer at Goldman Sachs. He received his master’s in 
computer science from Columbia University in 2011. As a graduate  research assistant at Columbia, 
Ramaswamy worked on implementing key re-encryption protocol and on measuring organization 
security posture using automated tool development.
© 2012 IEEE and published here with  permission. Homeland Security Affairs is an 
academic journal available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the 
purpose of  this publication  is the widest possible dissemination of knowledge, copies 
of this journal and the articles contained herein  may  be printed or downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any commercial  use of this article is expressly prohibited 
without the written  consent of the copyright holder, the Institute of Electrical  and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Homeland Security Affairs is the online journal  of  the 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 5, Article 2 (May 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Integrated PMR-Broadband-IP Network for Secure
Realtime Multimedia Information Sharing
Sebastian Subik and Christian Wietfeld





Abstract—In this paper, the authors present a novel solution
for the integration of TETRA-based PMR and IP based wireless
broadband networks through a novel inter-system interface. This
solution enables secure group communications based on PMR
standards using heterogeneous devices ranging from a traditional
PMR device to smart phones such as the iPhone. Thereby a
Smart-phone user will be enabled to leverage on one hand the
multimedia data capabilities of 3G and 4G wireless networks
(UMTS, LTE) while at the same time be part of a PMR group
communication. In other words, any authorized Smart-phone
can become part of a PMR communication group by simply
downloading the appropriate, dedicated Application. As a key
benefit, homeland security personnel can be included in the
disaster response actions instantaneously, without necessarily
carrying around a PMR device and without the need for
PMR coverage. In contrast to existing solutions, the proposed
interface solution prevents the reduction of the voice quality
when bridging system boundaries by tandem encoding with a
TETRA-over-IP (ToIP) interconnection. The presented solutions
include different interconnection setups including Trunked Mode
(TMO) and Direct Mode (DMO) capabilities. To enable the
group communications services as known in PMR systems, a
dedicated protocol, the Push-to-X protocol developed by CNI, is
leveraged. The results of performance evaluations show that the
speech quality is still acceptable even under harsh conditions. The
proposed system therefore paves the way towards a future, high
performance PMR based on LTE, while preserving backwards
compatibility with existing PMR systems.
Index Terms—Public Safety Communication Network; Inter-
System-Interface; TETRA; LTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient disaster preparation, recovery and response relies
on secure information sharing through wireless communica-
tion systems. Standardized Digital Professional Mobile Radio
systems (PMR), such as Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA),
have been established in recent years and provide secure voice
as well as limited data services (similar to 2G commercial
mobile radio systems). While commercial 3G or 4G mobile
radio and WiFi-based systems provide today high performance
broadband services, homeland security organizations ask for
the same level of service for their purposes. While dedicated
next generation professional radio systems still have a long
way to go in terms of standardization as well as full de-
ployment, there is a realistic option to enable interoperability
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Fig. 1. Existing and Future Wireless Network Technologies
A. Evolution of Wireless Communications Systems
As depicted in Figure 1 the performance of the technolo-
gies in the private sector grows faster than in Public Safety
Communication (PSC). Nowadays communication systems as
802.11 n for local networks and LTE (4G) wide area cellular
networks provide data rates up to 100 MBit/s with a roadmap
for the next years up to 1 GBit/s. This enables the users to rely
on mobile data services and mobile Internet access in many
situations, including text, voice and video communication.
The overall performance of TETRA (and similar P25 net-
works) is on the level as public mobile radio was 20 years
ago, preventing the use of high-data rate communication such
as video transmission or extensive data access. Although
some enhancements are planned to the TETRA Standard (e.g.
TEDS1), the gap between the technologies is getting greater
over the time.
B. Migrations Strategies for Public Safety Communications
For the identification of suitable migration strategies for
PSC systems, the needs and requirements of public safety
communication are evaluated. The requirements of PSC and
the fulfillment of different types of communication systems
can be found in Table I. The requirements (sorted by impor-
tance) for PSC are:
• Voice Communication:
Because it is the most efficient communication between
1Tetra Enhanced Data Service











Coverage o +(+) -









Multimedia – + ++
Compliment: ++ full, + partial, o rudimentary, - not complied
TABLE I
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY USERS
humans, most of the communication in public safety
operations is based on voice.
• Group Communication:
The hierarchical structure in PS-organizations lead to the
need of the possibility for an efficient communication in
groups. Also different features need to be covered like
multi-listening groups and fast group changing.
• Capacity optimized for high traffic load:
In huge scenarios the system must be able to deal at its
theoretical limits to ensure stable communication links.
• Public Safety QoS:
Quality of Service has a huge impact on successful
communication. In dangerous scenarios, the transmission
of mission critical data needs to be guaranteed.
• Security:
Most of the exchanged information are either official or
classified which requires a high level of security from
end-to-end even over systems’ boundaries.
• Ad-Hoc Capability:
Incident responders require the capability of commu-
nication in every situation. Under harsh environmental
conditions, the infrastructure based network could be
out of order or could not provide a sufficient coverage
at the incident scene. In such a case, the ability of
direct communication between the responders needs to
be ensured.
• High data rates for Multimedia Communication:
With the increasing capabilities of public radio networks,
the need for high data-rates are also growing in the public
safety organizations. Online access to various information
systems like [1] increase the effectiveness of rescue
operations.
None of the currently available systems fulfills all require-
ments. The PMR systems match most of the requirements,
but because of the long deployment cycles in this market, the
coverage and available data rates are insufficient. Public Cellu-
lar Networks (esp. latest LTE Advanced) are not developed to
match the public safety requirements, thus the specific features
as group communication and direct mode is not supported.
Local wireless networks provide a sufficient data rate for
multimedia communication, but network management features
and QoS requirements are missing.
For the Next Generation Public Safety Communication
System (NG-PSCS) the authors propose the following strategy:
Seamless enhancement of existing PMR systems with hetero-
geneous state-of-the-art technologies while the next generation
system is under development. The remainder of the paper is
structured as follows:
In Section II the authors outline the architecture of a Next
Generation Public Safety Communication System (NG-PCS).
The focus lies not on a complete specification but more
on a identification of core elements and technologies for
the foundation of the system. In Section III, an overview
over actual research work on the interoperability of different
TETRA networks is presented. In Section IV and IV-A the
authors propose a gateway for the enhancement and seamless
coupling of TETRA and IP-based networks, which fulfills the
requirements of public safety organizations. A validation and
performance evaluation of the proposed gateway is given in
Section V.
II. NEXT GENERATION PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS
As the result of the current situation, the Next Generation
Public Safety Communication System (NG-PSC) needs to
perform a huge leap to the latest technologies for mobile
radio communication. Compared to Table I, public cellular
technologies like LTE Advanced offer sufficient performance
for all kind of communication, but important features are
missing. Local wireless networks provide superior data rates
for short distances and are able to be connected in an ad-hoc
network.
A suitable solution for the next generation communication
system for public safety is a soft migration to an all IP based
network which provide all necessary features as services but
is independent from the underlying radio technology. The will
enable the public safety organizations to benefit from the latest
developments without losing the backwards compatibility to
existing well established communication systems.
A first concept and evaluation of IP networks for emergency
communication is presented in [2]. The results show that the
use of a light-weight all IP-based peer-to-peer structure can
fulfill the requirements of effective emergency communication.
The lean Push-to-X protocol developed by the authors is
also leveraged in the proposed new architecture and further
developed.
The architecture of the proposed system is depicted in
Figure 2. The fundamental features are implemented as a
set of dedicated services inside the all-IP based network
(e.g. Security, Group Communication, Gateway to extended
Networks). The modular approach is elementary for the mi-
gration approach. While the NG-network is not installed in
the field, other networks are coupled to the core network as
extended networks. This intermediate solution can start with
actual TETRA networks today to close the technology gap to
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existing systems and can seamlessly be operated until the next
generation is ready.
The extended networks include public mobile networks with
a good coverage and high data rates (e.g. LTE Advanced,
WiMAX) as well as dedicated ad-hoc incident scene networks
as described in [3]. To complete the requirements of public
safety organizations, the NG-PSC also needs to implement ad-
hoc and direct mode functionality. The underlying IP network
can be enhanced to easily facilitate such feature. e.g. by
leveraging IEEE 802.11 technologies.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR AN ENHANCEMENT OF EXISTING
PMR NETWORKS
As described in Section I, incident responders need reliable
and secure communication networks. Also, they should supply
sufficient QoS and data rates. Worldwide TETRA networks
are installed as main communication systems for public safety
services. However, nowadays needs for high bandwidth data
exchange is not fulfilled.
Some research has been provided for possible solutions
for enhancements of existing TETRA networks. The missing
implementation of real-world interconnection (except research
projects like [4]) between heterogeneous systems shows that
the limitations of existing and implemented inter-system in-
terface solutions hamper seamless interconnection between
trunked networks and modern communication technologies.
To understand the requirements of such solutions, the funda-
mental network configurations need to be analyzed. In Figure
3 the different configurations for PMR networks are shown.
Figure 3(a) shows the standard trunked mode configuration
(TMO). All mobile terminals are connected via a switching
and management infrastructure (SwMI). In Figure 3(b) the
setup for the ad-hoc or direct mode (DMO) is shown. In
this mode, all terminals are connected directly (in case of
out of coverage operations or infrastructure failure). The last
standardized set-up is displayed in Figure 3(c). In this Gateway
Mode (GMO), one terminal acts as a gateway between a DMO
and a TMO configuration to enhance the networks’ coverage.
The idea of interconnecting PMR networks is not new. In [5],
an overall description of Public Safety and Disaster Relief
(PSDR) communication is presented. As an addition to a gen-
eral overview, key performance indicators and parameters of
such a heterogeneous communication system is given. Also [6]
aims to an extension of a TETRA switching and management
infrastructure (SwMI) with 802.11 access points. Therefore, an
inter-working-function (IWF) is defined to include the APs to
the TETRA network in the same way a base-station would be.
The necessary signaling and data transmission is implemented
with a full tunnel of the TETRA protocol stack with an
additional adaption layer. In the same way the authors of [7]
present their idea for a multi-functional TETRA gateway for
industrial applications. Both solutions require to include all
TETRA internal protocols (such as SNDCP2, MM2, CMCE2,
MLE2, LLC2) in the IP tunnel, which lead to an expansion of
2 Defined in [8]
SwMI
(a) Trunked Mode TMO (b) Direct Mode DMO
SwMI
(c) Gateway Mode GMO
SwMI
IP
(d) Emergency Network Coupling
Fig. 3. Network Configurations for PMR Systems
the SwMI with all inherit problems, especially very restricted
timing defaults. This defaults can lead to problems, if the
interconnected network could not fulfill strict requirements
(e.g. satellite networks [9]).
A more complex setup is the basis of [10]. The authors
propose a new air interface for the interconnection of the
heterogeneous systems (here: WiMAX, TETRA and TEDS3).
Although a good solution is provided, the introduction of a
new air interface (which also requires new hardware) could
hamper a wide implementation.
All of the presented solutions aim at an interconnection
in the IP-backbone or core network. This approach implies
preceding planning and forbids flexible usage of the interface.
For example, if the connection of a base station to the SwMI
(core network) is broken, they operate in a fall back mode to
enable local communication inside of the cell. The setup is
shown in Figure 3(d). For an emergency re-establishment of
the full connectivity, only a connection on the air interface can
be used.
A similar set-up is basis of [11], in which the interconnec-
tion of different DMO networks over 802.11 mesh networks
is outlined. Also this approach is very flexible, it is based
on the standard PEI4 interfaces of TETRA. This interface has
only a PCM-audio signal defined as output for voice, what
leads to a so called tandem-encoding, when the signal passes
the systems’ borders (TETRA to 802.11 and vice versa). The
negative effect of tandem-encoding is shown in Section V.
3Tetra Enhanced Data Service
4Peripheral Equipment Interface [12]
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the Next Generation Public Safety Communication System
IV. TETRA OVER IP GATEWAY FOR EXTENDED NETWORK
COUPLING
The aim of the proposed TETRA over IP (ToIP) Gateway
is a seamless coupling of different IP-based network with
existing TETRA PMR networks while avoiding the restrictions
described in Section III.
As shown in Figure 2 as the PTX TETRA Gateway, we rely
on a dedicated protocol, which combines the TETRA traffic
air format with a minimal additional header for the signaling
information (push-to-X: PTX). The format was developed
and tested in IP-only environments under various conditions
[13] and [14]. The basic frame comprises is a one Byte
header extension to IP/UDP packets, in which all necessary
information (as well as signaling, security and various data
types) is stored. The necessary extension for the TETRA
system is the use of the original TETRA air frame format
[8] with ACELP [15] encoded voice including channel coding
for the data transmission. This facilitates a wide range of
application scenarios and services:
• TMO to TMO Link: If the connection between a subset of
base stations is destroyed, the isolated network could be
interconnected with the core network over any broadband
IP link (e.g. WLAN, WiMAX, LTE) shown in Figure 2
on the right side.
• Multi-purpose IP interface: To enhance the usability
various different technologies could be coupled to the
TETRA network with a TETRA over IP Gateway (Gate-
way Service).
• DMO to TMO Link: If no infrastructure is available,
terminals could also connect via the direct mode to the
gateway that provides the backhaul to the core network.
A. Digital Voice Interface with Push-to-X protocol
The format of the so called Digital Voice Interface is based
on the original TETRA air frame format. Because of the
TDMA structure of TETRA, a frame has a size of 54 Bytes and
IP (v4:20B or v6: 40B) UDP (8B) PTX (1B) DVI AirFrame (54B)
TABLE II
STRUCTURE OF PROPOSED PACKET STRUCTURE (WITH SIZE IN BYTE)
is send out every 56,67 ms. Additional, the one Byte Push-to-
X (PTX) header is added to the DVI to include the signaling
information [14] as shown in II. All necessary services as
Group and User Maintenance (including security), Session
Control, Codec Signaling and Payload Type are included in
the first three bit of the header. Followed by an bit, the last 4
bits are used for the sub-type field of the header. All types of
information can be carried inside a PTX packet, therefore the
’X’ represents audio, video and data transmissions.
This flexible format also enables the use of different types
of IP transmission, including unicast, multicast and broadcast
transmission.
B. Protocol Stack and Enhanced PEI Interface
The DVI/PTX interface outlined in the last Section is based
on TETRA airframes. Unfortunately the standard PEI interface
has not allow to access the airframes, as The endpoints defined
in PEI are layer 3 endpoints (TE2, MT2 5). The audio data is
only available in PCM-coded format. For the mapping of the
signaling, the TE2 interface provides sufficient commands, but
the audio export is still insufficient. Therefore, we propose a
new interface at the (D)TP-SAP6. At this interface, the data
has the format proposed in the last section and enables the
flexible usage of the new TETRA over IP (ToIP) interface.
This flexibility is given by including the signaling information
as a addition to the digital voice into the IP packets.
It also includes security features of the TETRA network.
For a transparent coupling of two security enabled networks
5 [12]
6(Direct Mode) Transport-SAP
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 5, Article 3 (May 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
(see Figure 3(d)), the end-to-end encrypted data does not need
to be decrypted (it is not possible) but can seamlessly pass
the intermediate network and can be inserted in the original
TETRA network.
V. VALIDATION OF ADVANCED USABILITY AND
PERFORMANCE BY SMART PHONES
For the analysis of the proposed interface as well as the
validation of the usability, a prototype was developed. Two
versions of the graphical user interface is shown in Figure 4.
The use of the iOS platform should not intend the application
of such devices for incident responders but enables homeland
security personal to be included in disaster response action
instantaneously. Because of the outstanding importance of
(a) Landscape GUI (b) Vertical GUI
Fig. 4. GUI of Prototype Client Application
voice communication in public safety scenarios, the authors
use the quality of voice transmission as the benchmark for the
proposed solution. To avoid subjective test runs, the Perceptual
Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) standard7 is used. It
is a family of algorithms and procedures comprising a test
methodology for automated assessment of the speech quality
as experienced by a user of a telephony system. PESQ is
an accepted and applied ITU standard for objective voice
quality testing. It is a full reference algorithm that evaluates the
differences between the original sample and the transmitted.
The result is a value for the mean opinion score (MOS)8, an
expression for the subjective quality between 5 (excellent) and
1 (bad).
Another advantage of the proposed system is the gain
of voice quality while passing network borders. In state-of-
the-art systems (see Section III), the voice data need to be
multiple encoded every time it crosses a systems’ border.
This is caused by the available interfaces, which are based on
PCM transmission or standard VoIP protocols. The negative
influence is shown in Figure 5.
For this test, the authors use original voice samples taken
from actual emergency operations. The setup for single en-
coding represents a standard PMR system, in which the PCM
recorded voice is encoded with the ACELP codec for the
transmission to the receiver. The results indicate the good
performance of the encoder, nearly all samples could match
the requirements (PESQ−MOS ≥ 3.02). Also, the use of the
7ITU-T Recommendation P.862
8ITU-T Recommendation P.800
Fig. 5. Performance Evaluation of Tandem Encoding
proposed PTX-TETRA Gateway avoids the re-encoding while
passings the systems’ borders and has the same quality as a
homogeneous system.
In contrast the tandem encoding setup indicate the per-
formance of standard network coupling. In this setup, the
voice need to be encoded at least twice. The first time to
be transmitted over the TETRA air interface and the second
time for the transmission in the extended network (i.e. WLAN
ad-hoc or LTE public network). The lossy encoding lead to a
decrease of the voice quality which can hamper an appropriate
communication under contrary conditions.
Beside the superior voice quality, the use of the original air
data format and speech coding including the corresponding
channel coding also increases the robustness of the transmis-
sion against different types of errors in the extended network.
For this paper, we focused the stress test of the system on
two different types of errors which can occur in extended
networks: bit errors and packet losses. The first error type
could be the result of too much interferences at the incident
scene, either caused by faulty working public networks or
by other incident scene networks as described in Section II.
A study of typical bit error patterns of WLAN networks is
given in [16]. We used a network-in-the-simulation to inject
the errors in the voice transmission. To identify the limits of
the system, extreme error rates as the worst case are simulated,
which should not occur in real systems. The tests are run 100
times each. The results are depicted in Figure 6 and it can be
seen that although the average quality is decreasing, the air
encoded packets can still be used for communication up to
an error-rate of 10−4. The increasing and varying maximum
quality of the stress-tests show the limitations of the PESQ
algorithm. Because it is based on mathematical difference
analysis, in some cases the result is identified as a good
transmission although the voice quality is insufficient as tested
by a subjective check from human users.
In the second stress test setup, the influence of packet loss
is measured. The results show that the PESQ value remains
acceptable up to 20% packet loss rate. The reason for this
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Fig. 6. Result of Stress Test: Bit Error Rates
Fig. 7. Result of Stress Test: Packet Loss Rate
quite robust behavior is the small packet size of 54 Bytes.
A lost packet represents a gap of 50ms in the uncompressed
voice stream, which can be tolerated by the human ear within
certain boundaries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper an innovative system architecture to integrated
PMR systems with IP-based wireless broadband system is
proposed and validated through a prototype development.
The evaluations performed with the prototype show that is
feasible to operate PMR services (in this case based on
the TETRA standard) with broadband cellular networks and
WLAN. Thereby an important gap between limited bandwidth
PMR and todays 3G and 4G broadband wireless systems can
be closed. The Push-to-X protocol developed by CNI has
proven to be suitable to support group communications similar
to PMR services in the IP world.
The prototype realization for a SmartPhone and corre-
sponding performance stress tests for harsh communication
conditions have demonstrated that SmartPhones can be directly
integrated by installing an appropriate application in PMR
group communications, enabling the communication in critical
situations even with homeland security personnel operating
out-of-PMR-coverage. The proposed system therefore paves
the way towards a future, high performance PMR/PSC based
on LTE, while preserving backwards compatibility with exist-
ing PMR systems.
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Abstract— Results from comprehensive testing of two prototype 
dual-energy (6 and 9 MeV) cargo inspection systems provide 
large databases of signature information of various high atomic 
number objects (active interrogation benchmarks) hidden in 
representative cargos.  Test objects were fabricated from lead, 
tungsten and uranium ranging in size from 75 to 430,000 cm3.  
ISO containers were filled with eighteen selected cargos that 
varied in density and complexity.  These databases, collected by 
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Cargo Advanced 
Automated Radiography System (CAARS) Program, provide a 
rich source of signature information that can be used to develop 
automated and user-assist detection algorithms. 
Keywords-component; Inspection systems, automated detection, 
dual-energy, High-Z signature. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fig. 1 is a radiograph with a simulated threat object hidden 
among automobile engines in a shipping container.  The item 
includes shielding that would make it undetectable to passive 
gamma-ray detection systems.  As a Customs and Border 
Protection officer, your job is to identify and interdict 
smuggled items.  If the smuggled item is a radiological or 
nuclear threat that eludes detection, the consequences could be 
disastrous. 
 
Figure 1.  Test object is hidden in cargo container 
filled with automobile engines. 
Inspection systems that rely on human interpretation of 
radiographs are capacity-limited. On the other hand, routine 
high-speed inspection of cargo can be performed with x-ray 
inspection systems that use automated detection algorithms.  
Algorithms that detect subtle differences between images can 
thereby relieve inspectors of the tedium that comes with 
repeated visual interpretation of radiographic images. 
Fig. 1 comes from a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s 
database of radiographic images collected during test programs.  
The test programs were conducted to characterize the 
capabilities of inspection systems that employed dual-energy 
discrimination. 
II. EVOLUTION OF DUAL ENERGY DISCRIMINATION 
In 1975, Alvarez and Maovski advanced the idea of using 
two x-ray spectra to separate the effects of photoelectric 
interaction and Compton scattering in order to improve medical 
diagnostic information extraction from computerized 
tomography systems [1].  In 1992, Eilbert and Krug described a 
baggage inspection system based on a single view, dual energy 
concept [2].  The airport security system was designed to detect 
explosives and contraband via separation of bag contents based 
on atomic number.  This system’s decision software employed 
“background subtraction” to remove the effects of overlaying 
objects.  In 1996, Neale et al. were granted a patent for an 
inspection apparatus for subjecting baggage and containers to 
x-rays of two different energies [3].  Atomic number of the 
contents was determined from look-up tables based on the ratio 
of the signals at the two energies.  Ogorodnikov and Petrunin 
extended the idea to a dual energy (4 MeV/ 8 MeV) cargo 
inspection system useable with full-size shipping containers 
[4].  With this system, container contents were classified into 
four atomic number categories: “Organics,” “Organics-
Inorganics,” “Inorganics” and “Heavy Substances.” 
III. BASIS FOR DUAL-ENERGY DISCRIMINATION 
Dual-energy discrimination is based on the differences in x-
ray attenuation at two separated energies.  The difference is 
best expressed as a ratio of attenuation coefficients.  Consider 
the simple case of a bremsstrahlung source with energy-
integrating detectors.  Neglecting the interactions within the 
detector, for: 
NE(E) = number of photons in a pulse directed to the detector 
(as a function of energy) for spectrum EE 
µAIR(E) = attenuation coefficient of air 
tAIR = photon travel distance in air 
 
The total single-pulse energy arriving at the detector after 
travelling through air is: 
 !!,! =    ! ! !−µμ!"# ! !!"#!!0 !". (1) 
If the path is interrupted by a test object of thickness t with 
attenuation coefficient µ, the energy at the detector becomes: 
 !! = ! ! !!!!"# ! !!"#!!! !!! ! !!". (2) 
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 5, Article 4 (May 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
We can define an “average” attenuation coefficient (µμ!) for 
energy spectrum E such that: 
 !!!!! = !!! ! !!!! !". (3) 
Then, the natural logarithm of the transmission ratio is: 
 ln !! !!,! = ln ! ! !!!!"# ! !!"#!!! !!! ! !!"! ! !!!!"# ! !!"#!!! !" . (4) 
Assuming that the effects of the air can be considered 
independent of the effects of the test object, we have 
approximately: 
 ln !! !!,! = −µμ!!. (5) 
Taking the ratio of the attenuations at two energies (H = 
high energy spectrum and L = low energy spectrum) yields: 
 
!" !! !!,!!" !! !!.! ≅ !!!! . (6) 
The quantities on the left of (6) are all measurements from 
the inspection system.  The quantity on the right is a property 
of the test object’s material and is a function of its atomic 
number.  Fig. 2 shows how, in the case of mono-energetic 
sources, this ratio varies as a function of atomic number.  For 
CAARS, Z ≥ 72 was considered High-Z. 
 
Figure 2.  Attenuation ratio is a monotonically increasing function 
of atomic number. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF DNDO CAARS TD&C  
In 2006, DNDO established the Cargo Advanced 
Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program.  Two 
CAARS prototypes (built by SAIC and L-3) were designed to 
automatically detect nuclear and shielding material and to 
enable detection of contraband as well as or better than current 
systems with minimal impact to port-of-entry operations.  The 
culmination of each program was a government-run test called 
Technology Demonstration and Characterization (TD&C) 
conducted in 2009-10. 
Three different types of tests were conducted during TD&C 
but this paper focuses on the Detection-in-Cargo scanning 
results. 
V. PROPERTIES OF THE PROTOTYPE CAARS SYSTEMS 
The two prototype systems are shown in Fig. 3.  Each was 
designed to accommodate a full-size, over-the-road tractor-
trailer combination.  Both designs were gantries that 
transported x-ray sources and detector array(s) past a stationery 
vehicle at a nominal scan rate of 2.7 feet/second.  A significant 
design difference was that the SAIC source was an interlaced 
accelerator that alternately outputted pulses with peak energies 
of 6 MeV and 9 MeV.  In contrast, the L-3 prototype included 
two separate accelerators each with its own dedicated detector 
array. 
The CAARS systems were required to detect a 100 cm3 
cube of High-Z material behind 25.4-cm of steel anywhere in 
the container volume.  The false alarm rate was not to exceed 3 
occurrences per 100 scans.  To meet these requirements, each 
prototype contained sophisticated software for image 
processing and automated detection.  The systems presented 
radiographs and other information at the operator’s 
workstation.  When detection occurred, the suspect area was 
highlighted in one of two ways:  
Threat Alarm – Alert provided to operator that there was 
high confidence that High-Z material was present at the 
indicated location 
Unknown Alarm – Alert provided to the operator that there 
was insufficient information to make a high confidence 






































Source: J. H. Hubbell 
and S.M. Seltzer
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VI. CARGO CHARACTERISTICS 
Based on a DHS study of actual cargo densities and 
complexities, a subset of 18 cargos was selected to represent 
approximately 70 percent of the most commonly encountered 
cargo types [6].  The 18 cargos were classified based on two 
attributes, density and complexity, and organized into these 
four groups: (1) low density - low complexity; (2) high density 
- low complexity; (3) low density - high complexity; and (4) 
high density - high complexity.  As shown in Table I, the 18 
cargos provided five cargos for three of the four combinations 
of density and complexity, with the exception that only three 
cargos made up the low density-low complexity combination. 















Metal Furniture 0.12 
TVs 0.16 
Tools 0.27 
Office Furniture 0.23 
Cement 1.14 
High Low 
Plastic Scrap 0.36 
Lumber 0.42 
Newsprint 0.46 
Bottled Water 0.47 
Machine Buckets 0.49 
High High 
Transmissions 0.39 
Air Conditioner Parts 0.38 
Brake Parts 0.36 
Engines 0.36 
VII. TEST OBJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
Test objects ranged from simple geometric shapes such as 
cubes and spheres (on the order of 100-400 cm3) to larger, 
more complex geometries that possessed properties of interest.  
The largest of the test objects weighed nearly 1,000 kilograms.  
Though most test objects were made from High-Z materials 
(lead, tungsten and uranium), for comparison purposes, some 
were fabricated from tin and steel.  Fig. 4 shows a 
representative test object (“ball in a box”), which consisted of a 
central depleted uranium sphere surrounded by a lead-lined 
steel box.  Fig. 4 shows a radiograph of this object along with a 
false color map of the ratio of attenuations for the two energy 
spectra. 
 
Figure 4.  Representative test object consisted of uranium sphere 
in a lead box  
  
 
Figure 5.  Gray-scale radiograph (left) shows test object details and false-
color ratio image (right) is indicative of atomic number (scale at bottom). 
Multiple test objects were hidden in the containers.  An 
opportunity for detection of a test object was a “trial.”  
Typically, a container was scanned 12 times and then oriented 
in the opposite direction for another 12 scans.  Table II lists the 
number of trials in each test TD&C program. 
TABLE II.  SCOPE OF DETECTION-IN-CARGO TESTS 
Prototype System Number of Detection-in-Cargo Trials 
SAIC 8,320 
L-3 8,312 
VIII. EFFECTS OF CARGO 
The images in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 demonstrate the effects of 
cargo on a test object’s signature.  When placed in a uniform 
low-density cargo, the test object is readily discernable.  Fig. 5 
shows the test object in boxed T-shirts.  Comparison of values 
in the ratio image demonstrates the distinctive signature of 
High-Z materials.  
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Figure 6.  The test object is easily distinguished in both types of images of 
boxed T-shirts on pallets. 
When the density and inhomogenity of the cargo increases, 
the test object becomes much more difficult to discern.  Fig. 7 
shows the same test object in automobile air compressor parts 
of roughly the same size.  Even with the cluttering effects of 
multiple objects, the ratio image provides a signature of high-Z 
material.  
  
Figure 7.  When placed among air compressors of roughly the same size, the 
test object is difficult to discern in the gray-scale radiograph. 
Returning to the image of Fig. 1, Fig.8 shows a close-up of 
a pallet of engines.  The test object is well-hidden in the 
radiograph , but its signature is apparent in the ratio image. 
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Figure 8.  Attenuation coefficient ratio reveals location of test object 
from Fig. 1. 
IX. USE OF THE DATABASES  
The author’s personal experience with the databases has 
focused on understanding how signal properties affect the 
ability to generate automated alarms.  In addition to the 
databases for the two dual energy systems, a comparable data 
base exists for a single energy (6 MeV) inspection system.  
Besides the vendors who built the x-ray inspection systems, 
several independent developers have used portions of the 
databases to explore the capabilities of their unique algorithm 
approaches. 
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Abstract— Self-curing polysiloxane polymers have been 
developed for the forensic collection of latent signatures of 
explosives, organophosphates, and chemical warfare agent 
(CWA) degradation products. These polymeric materials 
penetrate the sample substrate as viscous liquids and 
subsequently harden to a semi-soft solid that can be peeled 
away from the substrate to extract signatures via the non-
covalent interaction of the newly formed polymeric material 
with the analytes buried within the substrate.  This paper 
discusses experiments aimed at altering the chemical and 
physical properties of the polysiloxane sampling materials to 
optimize signature recovery from porous substrates. The utility 
of this approach is demonstrated by the collection of target 
analytes from within concrete. The recovery of these signatures 
using the self curing polymeric formulations is compared to 
current operational sampling alternatives such as adhesive 
fingerprint lifters and swabs. Demonstration of the 
preparation, extraction, and analytical methods for the 
detection of the target analytes is also presented. 
Keywords- polymers; explosives; organophosphates; 
pesticides; LC-MS; GC-MS.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Efficient recovery of high value signatures from porous 
surfaces (e.g., concrete, brick, and stone) presents a unique 
challenge as existing collection technologies do not 
adequately probe the pores, cracks, and crevices of these 
materials [1]. The porosity of these materials may allow for 
extensive absorption and concentration of chemical 
signatures below the surface of the material. This property 
presents not only a challenge to adequately recover these 
latent signatures, but also an important and underutilized 
sampling opportunity.  While relatively uniform and non-
reactive surfaces such as glass and counter tops are often a 
good choice for sample collection, there are many cases in 
which these exposed surfaces have undergone environmental 
changes or cleaning prior to the sampling event.  This 
perturbation often results in alteration, reduction, or complete 
removal of the once prevalent chemical signatures.  In these 
cases, highly porous materials may offer an extremely 
important sampling alternative, but only if they can be 
exploited efficiently.  
This operational need is being addressed through the 
development of a collection technique using self-curing 
polysiloxane polymers [2, 3]. In this case, these materials 
were specifically formulated to retrieve chemical signatures 
from within porous substrates by designing them to 
adequately penetrate a porous surface and harden to a semi-
soft solid that can be subsequently peeled away from the 
substrate, thereby extracting signatures buried within the 
material via the non-covalent interactions between the target 
analytes and the newly formed polymer. The collection 
materials are comprised of two components: 1) the Base 
Paste, which consists of vinylsiloxanes capable of 
undergoing crosslinking reactions with hydrosiloxane 
components, and 2) the Catalyst Paste, which contains a 
catalytic component that initiates the hydrosilyation reaction 
involving the addition of the hydrogen atoms bonded to 
silicon atoms across the vinyl groups [2-5]. In addition, each 
component also contains retarders that influence the onset of 
polymerization, surfactants that improves the wettability of 
the polymer, fillers to add bulk to the material, and other 
additives to influence various physical properties [2]. Table 1 
summarizes the components of the polysiloxane polymers 
developed in this study.  
TABLE I.  FORMULATION OF THE BASE AND CATALYST PASTES 












In the present study, we have exploited these 
polymerizable polyorganosiloxanes to recover representative 
explosives such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), 
cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), triacetone triperoxide 
(TATP), and   pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) (selected 




structures shown in Fig. 1), as well as organophosphates and 
pesticides (dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), fonofos, 
mephosfolan, malathion, parathion, and  a CWA degradant, 
4,4 oxide 1,4-oxathiane, structures shown in Fig. 2) from 
porous concrete surfaces. The utility of these materials is 
further demonstrated by comparing the extraction 
efficiencies of the polysiloxane materials to conventional 
operational sampling devices, in this case cotton swabs and 
adhesive fingerprint lifters.  Successful development and 
rapid transition of this novel sampling system (along with 
associated preparation and analysis methods) to field 
applications could result in a transformational technology 
that augments the capabilities of anyone concerned with the 
recovery of high value signatures for explosives, toxins, and 
biological threat agents. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Structures of the Explosives Analytes 
Figure 2.  Structures of the Oranophosphate and Pesticide Analytes 
II. EXPERIMENTAL 
A. Extraction Studies 
A 0.5 mL aliquot of a 500 ppm solution of each analyte 
was spiked onto a controlled area of a concrete surface and 
allowed to dry. For each analyte, three parallel surfaces were 
spiked to enable side-by-side extraction by a prototype 
polysiloxane polymer, an adhesive fingerprint lifter, and a 
cotton swab.  For extractions using the polymer, the material 
was applied to the concrete surface and allowed to cure for 
approximately 10 min. The polymer was then peeled off the 
surface and extracted with 5 mL of acetonitrile.   
The surfaces were sampled by the adhesive fingerprint 
lifters by applying the adhesive side to the concrete surface 
and applying pressure to ensure sufficient contact was made 
over the entire sampling surface.   The lifter was then peeled 
off the surface and extracted with 5 mL of acetonitrile. 
Extractions using the cotton swab were performed by 
brushing the swab across the concrete surface for 
approximately 5 sec. The cotton tip was then removed and 
placed in a vial. A 5 mL aliquot of acetonitrile was added to 
the vial, which was then sonicated for 10 min. The 
supernatant was then transferred to a clean vial for analysis.  
Due to requirements in the analytical method, a solvent 
exchange to ethyl acetate was performed prior to analysis of 
solutions containing DMMP, fonofos, mephosfolan, 
malathion, parathion, and 4,4-oxide 1,4-oxathiane,. The final 
solutions from all three extraction methods were diluted 1:1 
(v/v) using a solvent suitable for the analysis method. 
Samples containing RDX and PETN were diluted with 
water, those containing TNT and TATP were diluted with 
acetonitrile, while those containing DMMP, fonofos, 
mephosfolan, malathion, parathion, and 4,4-oxide 1,4-
oxathiane were diluted with ethyl acetate. 
B. Analysis Methods 
1) HPLC-MS/MS Analysis 
 
RDX and PETN were quantified in extracts by 
HPLC-MS/MS using a Thermo Fisher Surveryor HPLC 
coupled to a Thermo Fisher TSQ triple quadrupole mass 
spectrometer. Separation was achieved using a reversed-
phase, XBridge C18 column (2.1 x 50 mM, 5 µm) and a 
gradient program with mobile phase comprised of 0.25 mM 
ammonium nitrate in water (mobile phase A) and 0.25 mM 
ammonium nitrate in acetonitrile (mobile phase B). The 
initial conditions of 100% A were held for 3.0 min, and then 
the composition was linearly ramped to 50% A/50% B over 
17.0 min. The gradient was then changed to 30% A/70% B 
over 5.0 min, followed by an additional ramp to 5% A/95% 
B over 5.0 min. The mobile phase was returned to initial 
conditions in 1.0 min, followed by a 10.0 min 
re-equilibration time. Detection was by mass spectrometry 
using negative mode electrospray ionization (ESI) with a 
spray voltage of -4.0 kV and sheath and auxiliary gas flow 
rates of 50 and 20 arbitrary units (corresponding to 
approximately 0.75 L/min and 6 L/min), respectively. The 
temperature of the heated inlet capillary was set to 200 °C.   
The selected reaction monitoring (SRM) scan mode was used 
and the analytes were quantified using an external standard 
calibration curve. 
2) GC-MS Analysis 
 
TATP, TNT, DMMP, fonofos, mephosfolan, malathion, 
parathion, and  4,4 oxide 1,4-oxathiane were analyzed using 
GC-MS. Experiments involving TNT were executed on an 
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Agilent 7890/5975 GC MS equipped with a PTV inlet. The 
method utilized an RTX-5MS capillary column (15 m x 0.25 
mm id, 0.25 µm stationary phase thickness) and a 
temperature program to separate the analytes. The column 
oven was held at an initial temperature of 75 °C for 
0.6 minutes, ramped at 8 °C/min to 175 °C, ramped at 6 
°C/min to 240 °C, ramped at 40 °C/min to 320 °C and held 
for 2 minutes. Splitless injection was performed using a PTV 
inlet heated to 25 °C for 0.5 min and then ramped at 720 
°C/min to 250 °C and held for 2 minutes. Detection was by 
electron ionization (EI) MS. Target analytes were identified 
by comparison of the analyte mass spectrum to that of a 
standard prepared from reference standards. The analytes 
were quantified relative to an internal standard using a 
calibration curve. TATP samples were analyzed on a Thermo 
Focus DSQ II single quadrupole GC-MS equipped with an 
RTX-5MS capillary column (15 m x 0.25 mm id, 0.25 µm 
stationary phase thickness. Splitless injection at 110 °C was 
used with the following temperature program: the column 
oven was held at 50 °C for 3 minutes, ramped at 8 °C/min to 
180 °C and held for 3 minutes.  The mass spectrometer was 
operated in the full scan mode for detection. TATP was 
quantified using a calibration curve generated with a 
reference standard. 
Experiments involving DMMP, fonofos, mephosfolan, 
malathion, parathion, and 4,4-oxide 1,4-oxathiane were 
executed on an Agilent 7890A/5975C GC-MS equipped with 
a split-splitless inlet.  The method utilizes a Restek Rxi-5sil 
capillary column (30 m x 0.25 mm id, 1 µm stationary phase 
thickness) and a temperature program to separate the 
analytes.  The column oven was held at an initial temperature 
of 45 °C for 3 minutes, ramped at 8 °C/min to 121 °C, 
ramped at 16 °C/min to 145 °C, ramped at 8 °C/min to 
237 °C, ramped at 30 °C/min to 310 °C and held for 
10  minutes.  Splitless injection was performed using a 
split-splitless inlet heated to 250 °C.  Helium was used as a 
carrier gas at a flow rate of 2 mL/min.  Detection was by MS 
using EI.  The target analytes were identified by comparison 
of the analyte mass spectrum to that of standards, and 
quantified relative to an external calibration curve. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Development of Tunable Self-Curing Polymer 
Formulations 
Initial experiments were aimed at developing a polymer 
formulation that was optimized for the collection of 
explosives, organophosphates, pesticides and CWA 
degradation products from porous substrates. One key 
advantage of these polymers is their tunability. By altering 
the formulation of the base and catalyst components, the 
material properties of the polymer, such as cure time, 
viscosity, tear strength and surface interaction, can be altered 
to best suit the sampling need. Table 2 summarizes the 
attributes identified to have the greatest impact on the 
sampling capability of the polymers and the components of 
the formulation affecting each attribute.   
TABLE II.  KEY POLYMER MATERIAL PROPERTIES AND RELATED 
FORMULATION COMPONENTS  
Material Property Related Formulation Component 
Cure Time 
• Amount of catalyst  
• Presence of retarder  
• Amount of filler  
• Degree of crosslinking  
Viscosity 
• Amount of fillers  
• Viscosity of formulation components used  
• Type of additive(s) used 
Tear Strength 
• Amount of filler 
• Degree of crosslinking  
• Molecular weight of the individual 
components in the formulation (higher 
initial molecular weight gives higher 
strength product) 
• Inclusion of quadrifunctional resin (Q-resin) 
Surface interaction 
• Surfactant influences how the polymer 
interacts and thus binds analytes on a 
surface 
 
Selected formulations from the extensive refinement 
study are shown in Table 3. Due to the proprietary nature of 
the investigation, the specific components of each 
formulation are not detailed, however the critical material 
properties for porous sampling using the prototypes is 
shown. In addition to the properties shown in the table, the 
thixotropy attribute of the polymers was also minimized to 
allow the material to flow into the pores and crevices of the 
surface without the application of force to “flatten out” the 
polymer This characteristic increases the reproducibility of 
the application and sampling, while enhancing the ease of 
use and minimizing the risk of cross contamination.  Based 
on the results of the optimization study, formulation MR-32 
was found to have the most desirable materials properties 
and was subsequently used for further extraction efficiency 
studies. 




TABLE III.  SELECTED FORMULATIONS FOR THE MATERIALS 
PROPERTIES OPTIMIZATION STUDY 
Formulation Cure Time Viscosity Tear Strength 
SC-28 Moderately quick High Good 
CM-17 Very slow High Low 
MB-23 Very slow Very low Very low 
SS-12 Too slow Good Low 
LP-58 Very slow Low Very low 
JC-21 Very fast Very high Very low 
CH-38 Good Moderately high Low 
CM-92 Good Good Good 
LP-64 Moderately slow Moderately high Low 
MB-84 Very fast Very high Very low 
SS-01 Very slow Very high Very low 
SC-65 Good Moderately low Good 
HB-017 Good Good Good 
HB-65  Good  Moderately low Moderately low 
MG-58  Very fast Very high Low 
LB-38  Very fast  Very high Low 
CM-13  Good  Good Ideal 
SC-65  Good  Good Ideal 
MR-32  Good  Ideal Ideal 
JC-87  Good  Good Good 
Key to Polymer Material Properties 
Very 
undesirable Undesirable Moderate Desirable Ideal 
 
B. Extraction Studies 
To evaluate the extraction capability of the self-curing 
polymer formulations in comparison to conventional 
techniques, a known amount of various explosives was 
spiked onto concrete and collected by the polymer, an 
adhesive lifter, and a cotton swab. Samples were extracted 
from the polymer, lifter, and swab using acetonitrile and 
analyzed by GC-MS or LC-MS to identify and quantify the 
amount of explosive material collected. 
Representative results of the extraction efficiency studies 
are shown in Figures 3 and 4. In initial studies, three early 
polymer formulation prototypes, LB-28, MB-42, and HB-40 
were tested against a conventional adhesive fingerprint lifter 
for the extraction of TATP. Figure 3 demonstrates that all 
three of the self-curing polymers were able to extract TATP, 
while the conventional lifter was not.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Relative recoveries of TATP from concrete using prototype 
formulations compared to a conventional finger print lifter. 
The properties of MB-34 were further optimized in the 
refinement study to yield the MR-32 formulation. Figure 4 
demonstrates that MR-32 was able to extract TNT from 
concrete while the conventional swab and lifter did not show 
any recovery for the analyte. Similarly, the polymer 
extracted a significantly greater amount of RDX and PETN 
from a concrete surface than a conventional adhesive lifter 
and the cotton swab.  These results highlight the potential for 
improved trace level collection of explosive compounds 
using the self-curing polymers compared to conventional 
sampling materials employed in both portal screening and 
forensic field collections. 
 
Figure 4.  Relative recoveries of TNT, PETN, and RDX from concrete 
using the refined polymer formulation (MR-032) compared conventional 
adhesive fingerprint lifters and a cotton swabs. 
 
The extraction efficiency of the polymer compared to the 
adhesive lifter and cotton swab for organophosphates, 
including DMMP, fonofos, mephosfolan, malathion, 
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parathion, and a CWA degradant, 4,4 oxide 1,4-oxathiane 
spiked onto concrete was also evaluated. Samples were 
extracted from the polymer, adhesive lifter, and swab using 
acetonitrile and analyzed by GC-MS. 
Results of these studies are highlighted in Figure 5 for 
DMMP, fonofos, and mephosfolan, and Figure 6 for 
malathion, parathion, and 4,4 oxide 1,4-oxathiane. Similar to 
the results for the experiments involving the explosive 
compounds, these data clearly demonstrate that the MR-032 
polymer formulation recovered a significantly greater 
amount of each target analyte from the concrete.  In some 
cases, the conventional materials were unable to recover any 
of the target analyte, as seen with the extraction of DMMP 
and mephospholan using the cotton swab. The recoveries of 
DMMP, malathion, and parathion using the swab and 
adhesive lifter, and 4,4 oxide 1,4-oxathiane using the swab, 
were nearly an order of magnitude lower than those achieved 
using the polymer. Moreover, it is likely that the 
conventional materials only recovered residual analyte that 
remained on the surface of the concrete, while the polymer 
recovered more analyte by penetrating the pores of the 
concrete. On-going studies are aimed at demonstrating the 
utility of the polymers after the surface has been cleaned. 
 
Figure 5.   Relative extraction efficiencies of DMMP, fonofos, and 
mephospholan using the  polymer formulation MR-32 compared 
conventional adhesive fingerprint lifters and cotton swab. 
 
Figure 6.  Relative extraction efficiencies of malathion, parathion, and 4,4-
oxide 1,4-oxathiane using polymer formulation MR-32 compared to 
conventional adhesive fingerprint lifters and cotton swabs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Self-curing polyvinylsiloxane polymers are a promising 
alternative to conventional adhesive fingerprint lifters and 
cotton swabs for the collection of trace levels explosives, 
organophosphates, pesticides, and CWA degradation 
products from porous surfaces. The material properties of the 
polymers can be easily tuned through manipulation of the 
formulation, and extensive studies have been performed (and 
are on-going) to optimize these materials for the collection of 
these and other latent signatures from concrete and other 
porous and non-porous surfaces. The ability of these 
polymers to probe the cracks and crevices of porous material 
will ultimately enhance collection efficiencies and bolster the 
capability of forensic collectors.   
The success of these initial studies highlights the promise 
of additional work. In planned studies, the collection 
protocols, sample preparation and analysis methods will also 
be optimized to continue to improve collection and 
extraction efficiencies, and ultimately reduce the level of 
detectable contamination. In addition, new polymer 
formulations specifically designed for extracting other target 
analytes, such as biological threat agents, DNA and other 
analytes of forensics interest will be performed.  
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